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INTRODUCTION 
The de facto uniting criterion [among refugees] was the shared marginalization 
of the groups in their states of origin, with consequent inability to vindicate their 
basic human rights at home. These early refugees were not merely suffering 
persons, but were moreover persons whose position was fundamentally at odds 
with the power structure in their home state. It was the lack of a meaningful 
stake in the governance of their own society which distinguished them from 
others, and which gave legitimacy to their desire to seek protection abroad. 1 
-James Hathaway 
"'Our country,''' she will say, "throughout the greater part of its history has 
treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share in its possessions. 
'Our' country still ceases to be mine if I marry a foreigner. 'Our' country denies 
me the means of protecting myself .... " "For," the outsider will say, "in fact, as 
a woman, I have no country."2 
-Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas 
On March 9, 1993, Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (lRB) 
issued guidelines entitled "Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-
Related Persecution"3 (hereinafter Guidelines). The purpose of the Guide-
lines is to provide IRB decision makers with a means of interpreting the legal 
definition of a refugee in a gender sensitive manner. The Guidelines were 
issued amid public outcry over several well publicized incidents regarding 
the plight of women who had made unsuccessful refugee claims based on 
gender related persecution. In the first case, a Saudi woman, known as 
"Nada," defied the law of her country by refUSing to wear a veil. For this 
transgression, she was spat upon, publicly harassed, and threatened with 
arrest by unofficial "religious police." The Convention Refugee Determina-
tion Division (CRDD)4 panel hearing her case castigated Nada for her 
effrontery: 
II lui faudrait bien, comme toutes ses compatriotes se conformer aux lois 
d'application generale qU'elie denonce, et ce en toutes circonstances et non 
seulement, comme elle I' a fait pour etudier, travailler ou menager les sentiments 
de son pere qui, comme toute sa nombreuse famille, etait oppose au liberalisme 
de sa fille la demanderesse.5 
1. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 135-36 (1991). 
2. VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 108-09 (1966). 
3. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) 
OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT, (1993) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The IRB adjudicates refugee claims 
made within Canadian borders, including those claims made at Canadian ports of entry. 
4. The CRDD is the branch of the IRB that adjudicates refugee claims made inland or at 
port-of-entry. 
5. "like all Saudi Arabian women, the claimant would have to obey the laws of general 
application that she denounces, in all circumstances and not only, as she did, to attend 
Other cases involved women who fled their country of origin to escape 
husbands who physically or sexually abused them with impunity in 
countries where the criminal justice system offered no protection. The 
countries of origin included Trinidad, Bangladesh, Syria, Bulgaria, and 
Dominica.6 One case concerned a Trinidadian woman named Dularie 
Boodlal, whose husband abused her for seventeen years by beating her, 
cutting her with razors and knives, and slamming her head into a car door. 
She fled Trinidad for Toronto in 1988, only to be followed by her husband. 
After being convicted eleven times in Canada of either assaulting or uttering 
death threats at her, he voluntarily returned to Trinidad rather than serve a 
jail sentence in Canada. Dularie's husband continued to menace her via 
letters and phone calls, threatening to "chop her to pieces"7 if she returned 
to Trinidad. A spokesman for Canadian Immigration justified the denial of 
refugee status, and the decision to deport Dularie, because Trinidad had 
recently passed a family violence statute so that "she can avail herself of the 
protection of the authorities in her own country."B 
Without doubt, the Guidelines would not exist but for the concerted 
efforts of a coalition of feminist, human rights, refugee, and immigration 
activists, as well as the personal commitment and leadership of a committee 
of members working under the Chairperson of the IRB, Nurjehan Mawani. 
The content of the Guidelines reveal an indebtedness to thoughtful feminist 
analyses by Canadian and European authors about why and how to factor 
gender into refugee determinations.9 Another source of inspiration included 
school, work or accommodate the feelings of her father who, like the other members of 
his large family, was opposed to the liberalism of his daughter, the claimant." No. M91-
04822, (1991) D.S.S.R. 1096 (Decisions de la Section du statut de refugie). 
6. See Abuse-Refugee, 1st Ld, CANADIAN PRESS, 10 Jan. 1993, available in QUICKlAW, CP93 
Database; Refugee-Woman, Bgt, CANADIAN PRESS, 10 Feb. 1993, available in QUICKlAW, 
CP93 Database; Syrian-Woman-/mmigration, CANADIAN PRESS, 11 Feb. 1993, available in 
QUICKLAW, CP93 Database, Doc. No. 1811803; Women-Deported, Bgt, CANADIAN 
PRESS, 25 Feb. 1993, available in QUICKLAW, CP93 Database; Woman-Refugee, 
CANADIAN PRESS, 12 Nov. 1992, available in QUICKLAW, CP92 Database; Women-
Refugee, Cxn Complete, CANADIAN PRESS, 2 Feb. 1993, available in QUICKLAW, CP93 
Database. 
7. Battered-Refugee, CANADIAN PRESS, 16 Sept. 1992, available in QUICKLAW, CP92 
Database. 
8. Id. The denial of refugee status for battered women typically turns on the absence of 
state responsibility for the alleged acts, and/or the inability to link the persecution to one 
of the enumerated grounds. 
9. Articles cited in the GUIDElINES include: Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference: 
Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 518 (1989); Felicite Stairs & 
Lori Pope, No Place Like Home: Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status, 
6 J.L. & Soc. POl'y 148 (1990); A.B. Johnsson, The International Protection of Women 
Refugees-A Summary of Principal Problems and Issues, 1 INT'L J. RefUGEE L. 221 (1989); 
L. BONNERJEA, SHAMING THE WORLD: THE NEEDS OF WOMEN REFUGEES (1985); C.E.J. DE NEEF & S.J. 
DE RUITER, SEXUAL ViOlENCE AGAINST REFUGEE WOMEN (The Hague, Ministry for Social Affairs, 
1984). See GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 11, 14-15. 
a few favorable decisions in past refugee claims. In addition, an interna-
tional framework within which the Guidelines could emerge had already 
begun to crystallize in the late 1980s through the assiduous efforts of the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Com-
mittee. The most prominent among these projects was the publication of 
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women10 (hereinafter UNHCR 
Gender Guidelines). 
Shortly after the Canadian Guidelines were issued by the IRB, the 
Supreme Court of Canada released its long awaited decision in Canada 
(Attorney Genera/) v. Ward. ll Key aspects of this judgment reinforce the 
Guidelines and provide an important (if indirect) judicial affirmation of the 
Guidelines' underlying principles. Though the Canadian Guidelines are not 
the first formal gesture made by an individual state toward recognizing 
gender persecution,12 they are by far the most comprehensive. Indeed, the 
spirit of the Guidelines (if not each letter) was welcomed by most Canadian 
commentators and applauded enthusiastically by US and British refugee 
activists. The Guidelines have been cited approvingly by US scholars 
hoping to nudge their government in a similar direction.13 
On a more general plane, the Guidelines embody a pragmatic attempt 
to grapple with the complexities of invoking gender as a category. The 
stability of categories, and of gender in particular, has of late been the 
subject of lively debate among post-modern feminists. The alternate 
practices of deconstructing gender in the theoretical domain, while using it 
strategically in the real world, has generated an unresolved tension between 
theory and practice. Rather than engage this dilemma in its abstract 
formulation, I propose to use the Guidelines as an opportunity to inquire 
into the theoretical and practical implications of using gender as a category 
within the existing legal framework of refugee determination. 
10. UNITED NATIONS HiGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE 
WOMEN, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR GENDER GUIDELINES]. 
11. [1993) 2 SCR 689. 
12. The Dutch Refugee Council issued the following policy directive in 1984: 
It is the opinion of the Dutch Refugee Council that persecution for reasons of membership of a 
particular social group, may also be taken to include persecution because of social position on the 
basis of sex. This may be especially true in situations where discrimination against women in 
SOciety, contrary to the rulings of international law, has been institutionalized and where women 
who oppose this discrimination, or distance themselves from it, are faced with drastic sanctions, 
either from the authorities themselves, or from their social environment, where the authorities are 
unwilling or unable to offer protection. 
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 13 n.6. The European Parliament also passed a similar 
resolution in 1984. See id. at 12, n.6. 
13. See Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women 
Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNEll INT'l L.J. 565, 584 (1993); Nancy Kelly, Gender-
Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNEll INT'L l.J. 625, 
633 (1993). 
Part I examines the operational scope of the Guidelines in the broader 
context of Canadian and international refugee law, and refutes the "flood-
gates" argument that asserts that hordes of desperate women will surge 
toward Canadian shores. However, Part I also qualifies the claims of those 
who might overstate the practical benefits of the Guidelines for the millions 
of displaced women in the world today. 
Part II explains the substantive and procedural content of the Guide-
lines, using fact patterns derived from women's claims in Canada and 
elsewhere to illustrate how the Guidelines would operate. Part II also 
addresses some of the gaps and omissions in the Guidelines. 
Part III responds to the main critiques levelled against the Guidelines. 
First, it replies to the riposte of cultural imperialism advanced by those who 
resist the recognition of gender persecution in refugee law. Next, Part III 
addresses the contention that anything short of adding gender to the list of 
grounds of persecution in the refugee definition is an inferior and inade-
quate response. In so doing, Part III rejoins the question of categories in its 
concrete application, and queries the tactical merits of augmentation versus 
reinterpretation of existing categories. 
Part III also focuses on the respective paradigms within which refugee 
and feminist discourses operate. By allowing space for the twin claims that 
gender oppression in the name of religion, tradition, or biology may indeed 
be persecution, and that women are persecuted because they are women, 
the Guidelines appear to integrate key feminist insights into the official 
corpus of refugee discourse. Without detracting in any way from the 
Guidelines' many virtues, this section attempts to expose this alliance as a 
locus of considerable tension and even paradox. Finally, the conclusion 
questions the extent to which the feminist vector guiding the recognition of 
gender persecution can be contained within the orbit of conventional 
refugee law. 
I. WHO IS A REFUGEE? 
The popular understanding of "refugee" typically encompasses people who 
have been uprooted and forced to flee their countries of nationality because 
of war, famine, natural disaster, or human rights abuses. Using this 
definition, approximately 80 percent of the world's twenty-some million 
refugees are women and children. 14 In order to acquire the legal status of a 
14. SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, REFUGEE WOMEN 1 (1992); see also Monica Boyd, Gender Concealed, 
Gender Revealed: The Demography of Canada's Refugee Flows, in GENDER ISSUES AND 
REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 173 <York University, 9-11 May 
1993). 
refugee in Canada, however, a claimant must prove that she comes within 
the refugee definition contained in the UN Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees. 1s This definition is applied by all states parties to the 
Convention, and has been incorporated into Section 2 of Canada's Immigra-
tion Act: 
"Convention refugee" means any person who, 
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, 
(j) is outside the country of the person's nationality and is unable or, by 
reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail Iherlself of the protection of that 
country, or 
OJ) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of the person's 
former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is 
unwilling to return to that country, 
(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee .... 16 
In brief, a claimant must demonstrate that she fled because of a 
legitimate fear of persecution occasioned by her "race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion." This legal 
definition automatically eliminates millions of women from the Convention 
refugee roster, not because the impetus for their flight was gender-specific, 
but because starvation, war, and environmental disaster "don't count" for 
purposes of the legal definition. Regional instruments in Africa17 and the 
Americas18 have supplemented the Convention refugee definition with 
provisions that encompass victims of inter alia, civil war, events seriously 
disturbing public order, or situations of massive human rights violations. 
Unfortunately, Canada is party to neither instrument. Canadian law imple-
ments the narrow refugee definition contained in the Convention. This 
relatively narrow formulation reflects the Eurocentric liberal rights paradigm 
from which it emerged. As such, it focuses on the violation of liberal 
15. Opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The geographic and temporal 
range of the Convention was expanded by the Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, opened for signature 31 Jan. 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791. Hereinafter, the 
Convention refers to the cumulation of the two instruments. 
16. R.S.C. 1985, c.1-2, § 2(1}. 
17. Organization of African Unity, Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee 
problems in Africa, entered into force 20 June 1974,1001 U.N.T.S. 46 (supplementing 
the Convention definition by recognizing claims based on "external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part 
of the whole of his country of origin or nationality .... "). 
18. Organization of American States, Dec/aracion de Cartagena, Doc. OEA/Ser.L./11.66, 
Conclusion 3 (status recommended for persons fleeing "Generalized violence, foreign 
aggression, internal confl iets, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances 
which have seriously disturbed public order"). 
individual rights for which the state may be held accountable. Its concep-
tual framework must also be assessed against the Cold War climate in which 
it was drafted.19 In any event, the confined scope of the Convention refugee 
definition necessarily has a disproportionately severe impact on women and 
children, because they comprise the bulk of the world's displaced people. 
Nothing in the new Guidelines ameliorates this harsh reality. 
Convention refugees are admitted to Canada via two routes: selection 
abroad and inland, or port-of-entry, claims.20 About two-thirds of Canada's 
annual intake are chosen and sponsored from abroad by the Canadian 
government, and roughly 60 percent of adults selected overseas since 1991 
have been men.21 The Guidelines do not govern overseas selection and will 
not affect this process, even though overseas selection generates a pool of 
refugees where men are clearly over-represented.22 Androcentric applica-
tion of the refugee definition may partly account for the disproportionate 
numbers of male refugees selected abroad, but Canada compounds the 
anomaly with the addition of a "personal suitability" or "admissibility" 
component above and beyond the refugee selection criteria. As Monica 
Boyd explains, 
For admission into Canada from outside the country, a person first must meet 
the United Nations criteria of a convention refugee .... But the person then 
also must meet the criteria of admissibility, which generally means that the 
person should exhibit the potential for eventual successful settlement in 
Canada. The characteristics used to evaluate such potential are largely of a 
socio-economic nature, such as exposure to Western lifestyles, education, job 
skills, and knowledge of English or French. These criteria do not include gender. 
However, these gender-free criteria are not gender neutral in their conse-
quences. Gender stratification in many countries means that women receive 
fewer educational opportunities than men, are less likely to acquire English or 
French language skills as part of schooling, and may have less exposure to 
urban or industrial jobs. Furthermore, given the gender gap in Canadian wages, 
women may be considered less economically self-sufficient than men if they 
have many dependents. Finally, gender stratification in refugee camps also can 
result in male refugees occupying important mediating positions that increase 
the chances of selection for resettlement. 23 
19. For a brief overview of the drafting history of the Convention, see HATHAWAY, supra note 
1, at 6-10. 
20. Canada also admits a variety of individuals in "refugee like" situations on an ad hoc 
basis. In the past, these have included Vietnamese boat people, self-exiles, and 
internally displaced. These individuals are admitted under the rubric of "designated 
group." See Boyd, supra note 14. 
21. Canadian Council for Refugees, Consultation on Gender Issues and Refugees, at 23 (Fall 
1993). 
22. Overseas selection is performed by staff within the Department of Citizenship & 
Immigration, and falls outside the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Refugee Board. 
23. Boyd, supra note 14, at 12-13; see also Doreen Indra, Gender: A Key Dimension of the 
Refugee Experience, 6 REFUGE 3, 3-4 (1987). 
------------------------------------------, 
In the mid-1980s, the UNHCR acknowledged the gender skew in 
overseas selection and launched an initiative known as the Women at Risk 
(AWR) programme. The programme targets women in refugee camps who 
are in immediate peril of harassment, physical/sexual abuse or refoulement. 
Candidates may also be drawn from the pool of those "existing in 
permanently unstable circumstances which allow for no other remedy."24 
These include women who qualify as Convention refugees, but present poor 
resettlement prospects because they 1) have many small children and no 
spouse, 2) have low skill levels, or 3) for other reasons "have been passed 
over by Canada or by other resettlement countries in the past."2S Participat-
ing states acknowledged that the costs associated with successful resettle-
ment may be higher for Women at Risk than other refugees. 
Canada was the first to respond to the UNHCR initiative in 1988.26 
Between 1988 and July 1993, Canada accepted a total of 586 women and 
children through the AWR ProgrammeP As of 1991, Women at Risk 
comprised 0.8 percent of the 48,723 Convention refugees accepted into 
Canada.28 In other words, the AWR Programme, laudable in its conception, 
has in practice scarcely touched the numbers and proportion of women 
refugees resettled in Canada. 
Because the Guidelines only apply to the determination of refugee 
claims within Canada, they do not apply to women unable to make the 
journey to Canada. Approximately two-thirds of asylum seekers in Canada 
are male.29 A variety of psychological, cultural, and financial impediments 
render women less able than men to undertake the hazardous, uncertain, 
and expensive journey to Canada. The new Guidelines will not eliminate 
the array of obstacles blocking women's access to the refugee determination 
process. As Nada herself explained, 
First of all, it's very hard to leave [Saudi Arabia). Even if a woman thinks about 
leaving, she cannot get permission. It's also not easy for a woman to do things 
by herself. Women are raised to be incapable of doing anything. One pays a big 
price to come here and the woman who is willing to do that is rare.30 
Refugee scholar James Hathaway confirmed the bleak options available 
to women who flee when he stated, "We're not going to see a flood of 
24. Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Manual (Selection and Control) IS 3.13, No. 
2, June 1990. 
25. Id. 
26. New Zealand and Australia have since developed similar programs. 
27. Consultation on Gender Issues and Refugees, supra note 21, at 26. 
28. Boyd, supra note 14, at 187. 
29. Id. at 178. Curiously, women claimants were slightly more successful in their claims 
than their male cohorts. Id. at 183. 
30. Ed Broadbent, Director of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development made the same point even more trenchantly: "The women we're talking 
female claimants. Most women can't get out of their countries, and when 
they can, they're lucky to make it to the next country.'t31 The reality is that 
permanent resettlement or asylum in a remote country like Canada will 
never be a viable or even desirable option for the overwhelming majority of 
displaced women, quite apart from whether gender persecution is recog-
nized as a basis for refugee status. Scaremongers who invoke the spectre of 
"tens of millions of [women) refugees"32 swarming the Canadian border 
should feel chastened by this fact; advocates who hail the Guidelines as a 
major breakthrough in refugee protection should likewise feel tempered in 
their enthusiasm. 
II. THE GUIDELINES 
Notably, the Guidelines do not alter the statutory definition of a refugee. 
That is to say, they do not add gender to the grounds of persecution, grounds 
that currently consist of "race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion." Indeed, the IRB lacks jurisdic-
tion to amend the refugee definition; only Parliament can do so. Instead, the 
Guidelines offer members of the CRDD a way of interpreting the existing 
Convention refugee definition in a manner that recognizes the interplay 
between gender and persecution. The Guidelines proceed from the follow-
ing general proposition: 
Although gender is not specifically enumerated as one of the grounds for 
establishing Convention refugee status, the definition of Convention refugee 
may properly be interpreted as providing protection to women who demon-
strate a well-founded fear of gender-related persecution by reason of any, or a 
combination of, the enumerated grounds.33 
In essence, the Guidelines supply advice on gender-sensitive ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation. They cannot bind individual decision-
makers, as this would fetter their discretion.34 While the Guidelines are not 
about can't jump in the car and go to the airport to buy a ticket; they aren't permitted 
to drive. And they don't exactly have an American Express gold card that they could use 
to buy tickets to fly here." Women-Refugees, Bgt, CAN. PRESS, 10 Jan. 1993, available in 
QUICKLAW, CP93 Database. 
31. Domestic Abuse Accepted for Refugee Status, GLOBE AND MAil, 10 Feb. 1993, at A 1, A2. 
32. Women-Refugees, Bgt, supra note 30 (remarks of Bernard valcourt, then Minister of 
Employment & Immigration); see also Barbara Amiel, The female refugee: a fraudulent 
concept, MACLEAN'S MAG., 29 Mar. 1993, at 9. 
33. Guidelines, supra note 3, at 2. 
34. The administrative law principle of fettering discretion requires that in applying a law (in 
this instance the Immigration Act), a decisionmaker cannot be restricted in her task by 
something less than law (in this instance the Guidelines). The Guidelines can only 
guide, they cannot compel. 
law, the Chair of the IRB gives members a bureaucratic incentive to take 
them seriously. Members must provide written reasons for any decision that 
rejects the principles adumbrated in the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines address both substantive and procedural aspects of 
gender as they pertain to refugee determination. I begin with the former and 
employ key components of the refugee definition as a framework for 
analysis. In order to establish entitlement to refugee status, the claimant 
must prove that: 
A. She has a well-founded fear of mistreatment that qualifies as 
persecution; 
B. The reason for her fear relates to one or more of the listed grounds 
(race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group 
or political opinion). 
A. Persecution / Lack of Protection 
Persecution contains two elements. The first is whether the harm appre-
hended by the claimant amounts to persecution.35 The second is whether 
the state can be held accountable, in some measure, for the infliction of the 
harm. One may be a victim of a violent crime, but that does not necessarily 
make one the victim of persecution. The Guidelines illuminate various ways 
in which gender is implicated in both the recognition of harm and the 
attribution of state responsibility. 
1. Gendered Harms 
Persecution is not defined in the Convention, and its meaning is deliberately 
left vague in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status36 (hereinafter UNHCR Handbook). The UNHCR 
Handbook indicates that: 
a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other 
35. See HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 99. 
36. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, Sept. 1979, re-edited Jan. 
1992) [hereinafter "UNCHR Handbook"], The Handbook is meant as a guide to 
interpretation; it exerts no binding authority over States Party to the Convention. As 
such, it occupies the same status vis a vis States Party as the Guidelines do vis a vis the 
Members of the CRDD. 
serious violations of human rights-for the same reasons-would also consti-
tute persecution.37 
Elsewhere, the UNHCR Handbook adds that other "prejudicial actions 
or threats" may amount to persecution depending on the particular 
circumstances. In addition, individual acts that might not amount to 
persecution when examined in isolation, may assume the character of 
persecution when viewed in their totality.38 
Canadian jurisprudence has wrestled with the task of concretely 
defining persecution. Various decisions have confirmed that persecution 
encompasses more than threats to physical security and freedom. As stated 
in Luis Enrique Toha Sequel, "we are not talking about physical torture 
alone, but about any act intended to deny or trample on a person's 
fundamental rights."39 The Supreme Court of Canada recently cited with 
approval a definition of persecution as "sustained or systemic violation of 
basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection."40 The 
linkage between persecution and the abrogation of basic human rights 
compels an articulation of what authoritatively constitutes a "human right." 
The Guidelines deal with this thorny question by advising decisionmakers 
to consult international human rights instruments for assistance:41 
(a) For the treatment to likely amount to persecution, it must be a serious form 
of harm which detracts from women's human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
(b) In passing judgment on what kinds of treatment are considered persecution, 
an objective standard is provided by international human rights instruments that 
declare the lowest common denominator of protected interests.42 
The Guidelines excerpr3 relevant provisions from various international 
instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)44 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).45 These are cited as authority for the general 
propositions that women and men are equally entitled to the civil, political, 
economic, social, and cultural rights guaranteed under international law, 
37. See id. at ~ 51. 
38. Id. at 'II 52. 
39. HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 108. 
40. Ward, supra note 11, per Justice La Forest (former member of Irish National liberation 
Army fleeing retaliation from INLA may claim refugee status if, inter alia, Ireland cannot 
protect him.) 
41. GUIDElINES, supra note 3, at 7. 
42. Id. at 10. 
43. See id. at 18-20. 
44. G.A. Res. 2200 (XX!), U.N. GAOR, 19 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976,999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
45. G.A. Res. 2200 (XX!), 19 Dec. 1966, entered into force 3 Jan. 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
including the right to life, liberty and security of the person; and the right to 
be free from torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.46 The Guidelines also cite the Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women47 (women's franchise and the right to stand for election 
and hold public office), the Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women48 (right to retain nationality regardless of her spouse's nationality), 
and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages49 (right not to enter into marriage without full 
and free consent, and the right not to be married until reaching a minimum 
age). Though not mentioned in the Guidelines, other international instru-
ments, such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights50 
(UDHR) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,51 provide additional sources of inter-
national human rights norms. 
Though international human rights instruments provide a reference 
point for assessing the seriousness of the harm inflicted on a claimant, it is 
important to note that in the international realm, all rights are not created 
equal. James Hathaway has catalogued the emergence of a hierarchy of 
rights contained in the "International Bill of Rights" {the UDHR, ICCPR, and 
the ICESCR).52 First order rights are non-derogable in any circumstances and 
include the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life; freedom from torture 
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom 
from slavery; and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Denial of 
these rights will always constitute persecution. Second order rights include 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; right to a fair trial; right to equal 
protection; presumption of innocence; freedom of opinion, expression, 
assembly, and association; and the franchise. States may derogate from 
these rights during an officially proclaimed public emergency. Otherwise, 
denial of these rights also constitutes persecution. Third order rights engage 
the positive duties of a state to progressiv~ly work toward the achievement 
of a right to work; favorable conditions of employment; entitlement to food, 
46. ICCPR (Art. 3: "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the 
present Covenant."); ICESCR (Art. 3: "The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant."). 
47. 193 U.N.T.S. 135,31 Mar. 1953, entered into force 7 July 1954. 
48. 309 U.N.T.S. 65, 20 Feb. 1957, entered into force 11 Aug. 1958. 
49. 521 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 Dec. 1952, entered into force 9 Dec. 1964. The Guidelines 
acknowledge that Canada has not ratified this Convention. 
50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (111), 
U.N. Doc. N810, at 71 (1948). 
51. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 10 Dec. 1985, entered into force 26 June 1987. 
52. HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 108-11. 
shelter, clothing, medical care, social security, and basic education; and 
protection of the family, especially children and mothers. These rights are 
unenforceable, but states are required to undertake a good faith effort, 
within the limits of available resources, to realize the goals in a non-
discriminatory way. Fourth order rights do not rise above the hortatory, and 
include the right to own and be protected from arbitrary deprivation of 
property, arid protection against unemployment. 
Feminist scholars in international law contend that the structure and 
content of international legal discourse is gendered at a number of levels, 
not least of which is its ordering of priorities.53 Having said that, it is not 
necessary to enter that debate here, because the fact remains that violations 
of women's "first" and "second order" rights are sufficiently routine and 
rampant54 that one can provisionally take the model on its own terms and 
still find massive derogation from the so-called higher order rights of 
women. 
The Guidelines observe that women are punished, abused, violated, 
and terrorized for reasons that only apply to women, and in ways that can 
only be committed against women. Each example recounted in the 
Guidelines pat~ntly threatens "first order" international human rights to life, 
security of person, and bodily integrity: 
The circumstances which give rise to women's fear of persecution are often 
unique to women. The existing bank of jurisprudence on the meaning of 
persecution is based on, for the most part, the experiences of male claimants. 
Aside from a few cases of rape, the definition has not been widely applied to 
female-specific experiences, such as infanticide, genital mutilation, bride-
burning, forced marriage, domestic violence, forced abortion, or compulsory 
sterilization.55 
Rape should be one of the least controversial examples of persecution, 
though this has not always proven to be the case. The UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines graphically depict the use of sexual assault as an instrument to 
torture women: 
Persecution of women often takes the form of sexual assault. The methods of 
torture can consist of rape, the use of electric currents upon the sexual organs; 
mechanical stimulation of erogenous zones; manual stimulation of the erog-
53. For critiques about the masculinist (and first world) orientation of international human 
rights discourse, see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International 
Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); Karen Engle, International Human Rights and 
Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 517 (1992); Hilary Charlesworth, 
What are 'Women's International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 58-84 
(Rebecca Cook ed., 1994). 
54. For a recent exploration of this topic, see Catharine MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and 
Women's Human Rights, 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 5 (1994). 
55. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 7. 
enous zones; the insertion of objects into the body-openings (with objects made 
of metal or other materials to which an electrical current is later connected); the 
forced witnessing of unnatural sexual relations; forced masturbation or to be 
masturbated by others; fellatio and oral coitus; and finally, a general atmo-
sphere of sexual aggression and threats of the loss of the ability to reproduce 
and enjoyment of sexual relations in the future. 56 
Women may be sexually assaulted by state actors in a myriad of 
circumstances. Women detained for political reasons may be raped (along 
with other forms of torture) as part of interrogation. Women imprisoned or 
detained for non-political reasons may be raped for the amusement of their 
captors. Civilian women may be raped by government or opposition militia 
as part of a campaign to terrorize the local population, punish politically 
active males by proxy, or "reward" victorious combatants with the bodies of 
vanquished women.57 
Some decisionmakers have proven unable to grasp the nature of rape by 
state actors as an integral and tactical part of the arsenal of weapons 
deployed to brutalize, dehumanize, and humiliate women and demoralize 
their kin and community. In Campos-Guardado v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, 58 the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals preferred 
to characterize such an act as the random expression of spontaneous sexual 
impulses by an individual military officer toward a woman, who happened 
to be captured while in the company of an uncle suspected of subversive 
political activities59-in other words, a common crime. In another US case, 
an Immigration Judge concluded that the rape of a Salvadoran claimant by 
a soldier who accused her of being a guerilla was not tacitly sanctioned 
activity, but "was more because she was a female convenient to a brutal 
soldier acting only in his own self-interest."6D 
56. UNHCR GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 'II 59 (emphasis in original). 
57. Various human rights agencies have documented these practices of sexual violence 
against women in numerous countries of the world. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RAPE AND 
SEXUAL ABUSE: TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN DETENTION (AI/London, 1992); AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, INDIA: TORTURE RAPE AND DEATHS IN CUSTODY (AI/London, 1991); AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN IN THE FRONT LINE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN (AI/New 
York, 1991); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: POLICE ABUSE OF WOMEN IN PAKISTAN 
(Human Rights Watch/New York, 1992); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN IN BRAZIL (Human Rights Watch/New York, 1991). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
UNTOLD TERROR: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PERU'S ARMED CONFLICT (Human Rights Watch/ 
New York, 1992). 
58. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987). 
59. Id. at 289; see also Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992). For a discussion 
of the American jurisprudence in this area, see Kelly, supra note 13, at 638-42, and 
Jacqueline Castel, Rape, Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Persecution, 4 INT'L J REF. L. 
39 (1992). 
60. Quoted in Amnesty International, Women in the Front Line, supra note 58, at 17. This 
construction of rape as a spontaneous "out of control" act by a renegade individual is 
central to rape mythology in non-war settings as well. It may be that judges unwittingly 
Other tribunals have refused to recognize widespread rapes by hostile 
militia as persecution, dismissing them as the common fate of women 
caught in a war zone.61 Why the indiscriminate (but systematic) nature of 
rape of civilian women by militia is relevant to the characterization of rape 
as persecution is unclear, but I suspect that the force of this argument has 
most likely diminished under the glare of mass rapes in the former 
Yugoslavia and the concomitant insistence that such violations are indeed 
war crimes.62 In addition, a German appellate court recently overturned the 
rejection of a Romanian claimant, who had been abducted and sexually 
and phYSically abused for two weeks by the town mayor and two policemen 
after refusing to have sex with the mayor in exchange for a work permit. The 
tribunal determined that the maltreatment constituted criminal acts by 
private actors; the court ruled that they were acts of persecution by state 
authorities.63 
Canadian tribunals have explicitly found that threats of rape and rape 
itself "are degrading and constitute quite clearly an attack on the moral 
integrity of the person and, hence, persecution of the most vile sort."64 The 
Guidelines confirm that rape may qualify as a form of persecution.65 It 
should be noted, however, that this recognition does not lead inexorably to 
the acceptance of a claimant as a refugee. For example, her credibility may 
still be challenged; the rape may yet be dismissed as a "common crime," 
especially if perpetrated by a private actor; or the decisionmaker may fail to 
see a nexus between the sexual abuse and a Convention ground. The 
Guidelines address these issues directly or by implication;66 these aspects of 
the Guidelines will be described infra. 
Even before the Guidelines, various CRDD and Federal Court of Appeal 
decisions furnished examples of persecution experienced mainly (if not 
resist seeing rape as part of an organized, deliberate campaign of terror against women 
during wartime because it would undermine their prevailing view about the practice of 
rape in peacetime. 
61. For a description of this trend in Germany, see Margit Gottstein, Women Refugees and 
Asylum Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Aims and Results, in 
GENDER ISSUES AND REFUGEES, supra note 14, 531-33. 
62. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 
AM J. INT'L l. 424 (1993). Human Rights Watch has documented the rape of Peruvian 
women by government security forces. According to a human rights organization in 
Peru, "Rape is a common part of the interrogation. They often do it just for fun." 
Peruvian Security Forces Accused of Indiscriminate Rape, GLOBE AND MAIL, 2 Feb. 1994, 
at A9. 
63. Case abstract IJRU0154, 5 INT'L J. REF LAW 275 (1993) (Administrative Court of Bavaria, 
Ansbach, AN 17 K 91.44245, 1992). 
64. Maria Veronica Rodriguez Salinas Araya, Immigration Appeal Board Decision 76-1127, 
6 Jan. 1977, at 8, quoted in HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 112, n.1 09. 
65. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 7. 
66. [1993] 2 FC 314 (FCA). 
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exclusively) by women. For example, in a case released the month 
preceding the Guidelines, a CRDD panel referred to the UDHR and the 
Convention on Consent to Marriage in arriving at the conclusion that forced 
marriage of a fifteen-year-old Zimbabwean girl to a polygamous man, 
followed by years of physical and sexual brutality, amounted to persecu-
tion.67 Compulsory sterilization of a woman who violated China's one child 
policy was also recognized as persecution by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),68 although at 
least one other panel on the Federal Court of Appeal came to the opposite 
conclusion in the case of a male claimant.69 
Gender persecution need not take the form of direct attacks on the 
physical integrity of women. According to the UNHCR Handbook, discrimi-
nation may amount to persecution if the measures "lead to consequences of 
a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g., serious 
restrictions on his [sic] right to earn his livelihood, his right to practise his 
religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities."70 Sex-
based discrimination is practiced universally and is enforced through law, 
social custom, and individual practices; it also violates the rights guaranteed 
in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW):71 
Article 1: For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination 
against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. 
Article 2: States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms 
and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national 
Constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not already incorporated 
therein, and to ensure, through law and other appropriate, means, the practical 
realization of this principle; ... 
67. No. U92-06668, Smith, Daya, 19 Feb. 1993. 
68. [1993) 2 FC 314 (FCA). 
69. Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration (1993), 20 Imm.LR (2d) 181. 
Considering that the decision in Cheung was cited with approval on the persecution 
point by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward, the ruling in Chan is surprising (Chan 
is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada). 
70. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 36, at 'II 54. 
71. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
18 Dec. 1979, entered into force 3 Sept. 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. NRES/34/ 
180 (1980), 19 International Legal Materials 33 (1980). 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
by any person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimina-
tion against women; 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination 
against women. 
In 1990, the UNHCR Executive Committee affirmed the linkage 
between a violation of the rights guaranteed under CEDAW and persecution 
for purposes of the Refugee Convention, stating that severe discrimination 
prohibited by CEDAW can form the basis for the granting of refugee status.72 
At the same time, the UNHCR Gender Guidelines acknowledge that "the 
dividing line between discrimination and persecution is not a clear one."73 
The Canadian Guidelines affirm that "severe discrimination on grounds of 
gender" can contribute to a finding of persecution, if "it leads to conse-
quences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the claimant and if it is 
imposed on account of anyone, or combination, of the statutory grounds for 
persecution."74 Unfortunately, neither the UNHCR Gender Guidelines nor 
the Canadian Guidelines assist in distinguishing persecution from "mere" 
discrimination.75 Nevertheless, to the extent that discrimination may be 
sanctioned unofficially as "policy" or formally in law, the Guidelines 
provide the following clues: 
A woman's claim to Convention refugee status cannot be based solely on the 
fact that she is subject to a national policy or law to which she objects. The 
claimant will need to establish that: 
(a) the policy or law is inherently persecutory; or 
(b) the policy or law is used as a means of persecution for one of the 
enumerated reasons; or 
72. UNHCR Executive Committee, Note on Refugee Women and International Protection, 
EC/SCP/59 (28 Aug. 1990), at 5. 
73. UNHCR GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 'II 36. 
74. GUIDElINES, supra note 3, at 3. 
75. The legal Services Division of the IRB recently attempted to distil the operative 
principles emerging from a series of discrimination-based claims into a usable 
framework for assessing whether discrimination amounts to persecution. The proposed 
test requires consideration of the type of right or freedom threatened by the discrimina-
tion, the basis of the threat, the nature and persistence of the discriminatory measures, 
and the seriousness of the harm to the claimant in the context of all the circumstances. 
Discrimination affecting so-called "first level rights" will more readily be characterized 
as persecution than infringement of lower order rights. The latter may also constitute 
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(c) the policy or law, although having legitimate goals, is administered through 
persecutory means; or 
(d) the penalty for non-compliance with the policy or law is disproportionately 
severe.76 
Although the Guidelines do not elaborate upon the foregOing proposi-
tions, the following examples may furnish plausible illustrations. In Nada's 
case, it may be argued that a policy77 compelling her to veil violates her 
"first order" freedom of religion or conscience. The premise is that if the law 
discriminates by selectively abrogating fundamental human rights of desig-
nated groups, the law itself persecutes. In principle, it should not matter that 
it would be relatively "easy" for the claimant to obey the law (and thus 
avoid prosecution) by wearing a veil, if in so doing she must forsake a 
protected freedom.78 
An alternative-and perhaps preferable-approach might analyze the 
Saudi dress code by considering the plethora of rules, policies, customs, and 
laws circumscribing the lives of Saudi women. Women are not allowed to 
drive, must sit at the back of public buses, are limited in their educational 
and employment opportunities, and may not travel without the consent of a 
male relative. Assuming that women qualify as a "particular social group" 
under the Convention refugee definition, the restrictions on dress may be 
understood as one strand in a web of oppression that cumulatively amounts 
to persecution of Saudi women. The various restrictions lead to "conse-
quences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the claimant"79 in terms of 
persecution, however, if the measures are persistent, systematic and "seriously affect the 
integrity and human dignity of the claimant" either individually or cumulatively. See 
Framework of Analysis, REFLEX (Special Issue: The Definition of Persecution), Sept. 1992, 
at 12. 
76. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 8. 
77. The Saudi state does not directly prosecute women for refusing to wear a veil. Rather, 
the quasi-official religious police (Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention 
of Vice), known as Muttawi'in deal with it as they see fit with the tacit approval of the 
state. In Iran, dress restrictions are codified in law and violations are prosecuted as 
crim ina I offenses by the state. 
78. To choose a non-gendered example, it would be "easy" for an Orthodox Jew to 
consume a cheeseburger; at another level, forcing her to do so would grotesquely 
abrogate her freedom of religion. In Pakistan, Ordinance xx of the Pakistan Penal Code 
declares adherents of the Islamic Ahmaddhiya sect to not be Muslims, and prohibits 
Ahmadis from engaging in certain religious practices associated with Islam. This makes 
it effectively impossible for Ahmadis to legally practice their religion. Such a discrimi-
natory law might be described as inherently persecutory, whatever the penalties for 
disobedience, though the IRB jurisprudence on this issue is mixed. See, e.g. CRDD No. 
T90-04196, Sultan, Dualeh, 1 May 1991 (negative); CRDD No. T90-04893, Aulach, 
Griffith, 18 June 1991 (positive). 
79. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 3. 
-- ------------------------------------, 
her ability to access educational facilities, to earn a livelihood, and to 
function as an autonomous and independent individual.80 
Another example of legislated discrimination that could be construed as 
persecutory are Pakistan's Hudood laws. One component of these laws 
requires that a woman alleging rape corroborate her complaint with the 
testimony of four male witnesses. Failure to prove that sexual contact 
occurred without consent leaves the complainant vulnerable to criminal 
prosecution herself for adultery or fornication. 81 As Human Rights Watch 
concludes: 
In sum, the Hudood laws affect all citizens of Pakistan, but are applied to 
women with particularly disastrous effect. Women are discriminated against by 
law, they find it extremely difficult to prove rape and may face criminal 
prosecution if they fail to do so. Women who behave in ways their husbands or 
fathers dislike, or who seek to divorce and re-marry, or who choose to marry 
against the will of their parents, or who happen to be related to a man wanted 
by the authorities and thus get wrongly accused of Hudood offenses as a means 
of intimidating their relatives, all risk criminal prosecution under the Hudood 
laws, often with no basis in fact. Their male co-defendants in such cases also 
suffer, although they are better protected by the law and benefit from its biases 
against women.82 
An example of a discriminatory policy with a legitimate end pursued 
through persecutory means might be the one child policy in the People's 
Republic of China. While the goal of population control may be entirely 
defensible, one may contend that forced abortions and forced sterilization 
of women are each persecutory means of accomplishing the objective. As 
Justice Linden bluntly asserted in his judgment in Cheung, "Brutality in 
furtherance of a legitimate end is still brutality."83 
Finally, a scenario where the penalty for noncompliance with a 
discriminatory law might be disproportionately severe might be illustrated 
by the Iranian law that makes a woman's failure to wear a chador a criminal 
law punishable by seventy-five lashes.84 Thus, even if one rejected the 
80. I prefer this approach over others with respect to dress restrictions. Laws prohibiting 
women but not men from wandering topless in public seem no less discriminatory than 
laws requiring men but not women to veil. In my view, what elevates compulsory 
veiling to persecution is the existence of "a number of discriminatory measures of this 
type, ... where there is thus a cumulative element involved" UNHCR Handbook, supra 
note 36, at 'II 55. 
81 . For a description of the Hudood laws and the consequences for women detained under 
them, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 57, at 47-94. 
82. Id. at 68. 
83. Cheung, supra note 68, at 323. 
84. See Namitabar v. Canada (MEl), FCTD Action No. A-1252-92, 5 Nov. 1993 (Tremblay-
Lamer, J.) 
contention that the discriminatory dress restrictions on Iranian women are 
inherently persecutory, one might still conclude that the penalty for 
violation of the rule is disproportionately severe in relation to the infraction. 
It is the penalty, not the proscription, that constitutes persecution in this 
example. 
2. State Accountability 
Exposing the gendered harms that women endure may not always be 
sufficient to sustain a finding of persecution. A well-founded fear of rape, 
dowry burning, genital mutilation, or domestic violence will only attract the 
label "persecution" upon the attribution of state responsibility to the 
conduct. If, as Hilary Charlesworth charges, "rights are defined by the 
criterion of what men fear will happen to them,"85 then so too with 
persecution. Thus, the paradigmatic examples of persecution typically 
involve the state actively engaging in the proscribed conduct, such as 
torture of political prisoners. 
Discriminatory laws and rape by military or police involve direct 
participation by, or on behalf of, the state. Conversely, domestic violence, 
dowry burning, and female genital mutilation are committed by non-state 
agents86 under the penumbra of state condonation, indifference, or impo-
tence. While there is no shortage of episodes where women are directly 
victimized by state actors, much of the violence committed against women 
on a global scale-rape, physical abuse, and murder-occurs in the so-
called "private" sphere. It is perpetrated by husbands, boyfriends, in-laws, 
and, in the case of genital mutilation, women in the local community.87 As 
Shelley Wright astutely observes, "for most women, indirect subjection to 
the State will almost always be mediated through direct subjection to 
individual men or groups of men."88 
The problem for a woman in Dujarie's position lies not in demonstrat-
85. Charlesworth et al., supra note 53, at 71. 
86. Or state agents acting in a private capacity. 
87. Literature on female genital mutilation as a human rights violation has proliferated in 
recent years, including ALICE WALKER, POSSESSING THE SECRET OF JOY (1992) and several 
documentary and legal accounts, among which are FRAN P. HOSKEN, THE HOSKEN REPORT: 
GENITAl AND SEXUAL MUTILATION OF FEMALES (3d ed. 1982); Allison T. Slack, Female 
Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal 1 0 HUM. RTs. Q. 437 (1988); Robyn Smith, Female 
Circumcision: Bringing Women's Perspectives into the International Debate, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 2449 (1992); Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human 
Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992). A singularly 
valuable source of information is President of the Inter-African Committee, Berhane Ras-
Work, Female Genital Mutilation, in GENDER ISSUES AND REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS, 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 1276. 
88. Shelley Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of Some 
Human Rights Conventions, 12 AuSTL. V.B. INT'L L. 242, 249 (1992). 
ing that the physical and sexual abuse she suffers constitute serious harm; 
rather, her task lies in persuading decisionmakers that the Trinidadian state 
is implicated in the infliction of the harm. The hurdle that Dujarie faces as 
a refugee claimant encapsulates in microcosm the critique levelled by 
feminist scholars against the public/private dichotomy in international 
human rights law. As Hilary Charlesworth writes, 
Although the empirical evidence of violence against women is overwhelming 
and undisputed, it has not been adequately reflected in the development of 
international law. The great level of documented violence against women 
around the world is unaddressed by the international legal notion of the right to 
life because that legal system is focused on "public" actions by the state. 
A similar myopia can be detected also in the international prohibition on 
torture. A central feature of the international legal definition of torture is that it 
takes place in the public realm: it must be "inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity." Although many women are victims of torture in this 
"public" sense, by far the greatest violence against women occurs in the 
"private" non-governmental sphere.89 
Dujarie's challenge is to demonstrate why Canada ought to care about 
her plight in the same way that it cares about the Trinidadian demonstrator 
who is beaten by police. It is a truism that refugee law does not protect 
individuals from "common crimes"; it only protects them from "persecu-
tion." The transition from "common crime" to "persecution" turns, in part/o 
on the role of the state in systematically failing to protect the claimant from 
the feared harm. As Justice La Forest stated in Ward, 
International refugee law was formulated to serve as a back-up to the protection 
owed a national by his or her state. It was meant to come into play only in 
situations where that protection is unavailable, and then only in certain 
situations. The international community intended that persecuted individuals 
be required to approach their home state for protection before the responsibility 
of other states becomes engaged.Q1 
The foregoing implies that, in exchange for obedience, the sovereign 
owes a national the duty not to violate her rights and a duty to protect her 
from transgressions by others. As Justice La Forest remarks elsewhere, 
"[slecurity of nationals is, after all, the essence of sovereignty."92 ObViously, 
state protection is absent where the state perpetrates persecution. State 
89. Charlesworth et ai, supra note 53, at 72. 
90. The other part of the equation involves understanding the violence as a systematic 
targeting of women qua disempowered group. See infra discussion "Particular Social 
Group." 
91. Ward, supra note 11, at 709. 
92. Id. at 725. 
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protection may also falter where the state condones, tolerates, or is simply 
unable to protect the claimant from the acts of others. Consistent with the 
dictum in Ward, the Guidelines declare that persecution includes "acts of 
violence either by public authorities or at the hands of private citizens from 
whose actions the state is unwilling or unable to adequately protect the 
concerned persons."93 In situations of domestic violence, state inaction may 
take the form of official condonation (e.g., marital rape exemptions in law). 
More often, lack of police response to pleas for assistance, refusal to 
investigate or prosecute individual cases, and a reluctance to convict or 
punish indicate that violence against women is legally proscribed, but 
socially sanctioned. Thus, the failure to protect women from intimate 
violence represents an uncoordinated yet highly efficient matrix of inertia, 
consolidated at all loci of the criminal justice system. 
The Guidelines' assertion that state failure to protect women from 
private violence constitutes persecution embodies a fortuitous convergence 
of refugee jurisprudence, feminist analysis, and evolving norms in interna-
tional human rights law. The UNHCR Handbook takes the position that 
"acts by private citizens, when combined with state inability to protect, 
constitute 'persecution."'94 In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada consid-
ered the question of state complicity where an Irish claimant feared 
retaliation from the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in circumstances 
where the police admitted they could not protect him. There was no 
suggestion in the case that the police cooperated with the INLA or 
condoned its vendetta against Ward. The Court in Ward endorsed the 
UNHCR Handbook and ruled unequivocally that "state complicity in 
persecution is not a pre-requisite to a valid refugee claim."95 As long as the 
state fails to adequately protect the claimant, it does not matter whether 
inaction derived from collusion, indifference, or genuine impotence. 
In Ward, the court found that where a claim is based on the state's 
inability to protect a national, the claimant must prove that she sought the 
protection of the authorities unless it would be "objectively unreasonable" 
to do so because state protection would not "reasonably have been 
forthcoming."9& As Justice La Forest states, "it would seem to defeat the 
purpose of international protection if a claimant would be required to risk 
his or her life seeking ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate 
that ineffectiveness."97 
93. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 3. 
94. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 36, at 'II 65. 
95. Ward, supra note 11, at 713. 
96. Id. at 724 (quoting HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 130). 
97. Id. 
Ward and its lower court precedents98 involved highly visible, politi-
cally motivated violence committed by non-state actors. The extension of 
the principle emerging from Ward to situations of dowry burning, female 
genital mutilation, and domestic violence require incursion into the so-
called "private sphere." At least one Canadian court demonstrated its 
willingness to move in this direction prior to the Guidelines. The case of 
Mayers, Marcel v. Minister of Employment and Immigration 99 involved a 
fact situation very similar to Dularie's namely, a Trinidadian woman subject 
to repeated physical and sexual abuse in circumstances of police indiffer-
ence. The narrow jurisdictional basis for judicial review in the case 
constrained the scope of the inquiry, but it is significant to note that the 
Court affirmed an adjudicator's ruling that domestic violence in the absence 
of state protection could constitute persecution. l °O 
Feminist theorists have long deprecated the public/private distinction, 
pointing out that the refusal of the state to intervene in the "private" sphere 
of the home only insulates abuse of pre-existing patriarchal power within 
that sphere, perpetuating and justifying the patriarchal organization of the 
"public" sphere.101 At the international level, the publidprivate dichotomy 
replicates itself. Because international human rights law only binds states, 
liability exists only if states can be held accountable for their failure to 
protect women from intimate violence. Unfortunately, just as local police 
are reluctant to intrude into the "private" sphere of the home, the 
international human rights regime is reluctant to intrude into the "private" 
sphere of domestic law and law enforcement. Catharine MacKinnon tersely 
explains the parallel: 
In this statist structure, each state's lack of protection of women's human rights 
is internationally protected, and that is called protecting state sovereignty. A 
similar structure of insulation between women and accountability for their 
violations exists domestically .... This is called protecting the community,l°2 
A core component of the "women's rights are human rights" campaign 
has been validation of the claim that states violate women's international 
98. Lower court judgments cited in Ward include Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) (1985), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.D.) (police unable or 
unwilling to protect Tamil Muslim from Sinhalese Buddhist mobs); Surujpal v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1985), 60 N.R. 173 (F.C.A.DJ (failure by 
Guyanese authorities to protect members of the People's Progressive Party from 
politically motivated violence). 
99. (1992), 97 D.L.R.(4th) 729 (F.C.A.D.). 
100. Id. at 738-39. 
101. A vast body of literature exists on this topic. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE 
WOMAN (1981); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL 
DIVISIONS IN LAW (1985); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989). 
102. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 15. 
human rights when they fail to combat violence against women, and these 
arguments have been eloquently and resolutely voiced by several feminist 
legal scholars.103 The principle recently obtained positive (if unenforceable) 
affirmation in the UN General Assembly with the adoption of the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,104 that defined violence 
against women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is 
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty whether occurring in public or private Iife."105 Article 4 of the 
Declaration exhorts states to inter alia, 
condemn violence against women and ... not invoke any custom, tradition or 
religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination. 
States should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating violence against women .... 
The Declaration remains unenforceable as international human rights 
law. However, developments on the international plane bolster the argu-
ments of refugee claimants, like Dularie, that the state is sufficiently impli-
cated in the harm done to them to constitute persecution within the 
parameters of the refugee definition. 
3. Prevalence of Gender Persecution 
The Guidelines also attempt to pre-empt objections to labelling various 
forms of violence against women as persecutory-specifically, the argument 
that a phenomenon that is widely practiced in a woman's country of origin 
or around the world could not be deemed to be persecutory. The Guidelines 
state that: 
The fact that violence, including sexual and domestic violence, against women 
is universal is irrelevant when determining whether rape, and other gender-
specific crimes constitute forms of persecution. The real issues are whether the 
103. See Dorothy Thomas & Michele Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 
15 HUM. RTS. Q. 36 (1993); Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A 
Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 53, at 85-115; Rebecca Cook, Accountability in 
International Law for Violations of Women's Rights by Non-State Actors, in RECONCEIVING 
REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAl LAW, STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAl POLICY No. 25 93-116 
(Dorinda Dallmeyer ed., 1993). 
104. GA Res. 48/104 Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. N48/49 (1993). 
105. Articles 1 and 2 explicitly encompass within the term "violence against women," 
"physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including 
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, 




violence----experienced or feared-is a serious violation of a fundamental 
human right for a Convention ground and in what circumstances can the risk of 
that violence be said to result from a failure of state protection.1()6 
The subtext of this passage suggests that the ubiquity and frequency of 
gender-specific violence does not detract from its character as persecution. 
Whether decisionmakers honor the implications of that insight remains to 
be seen. 
Although women everywhere may be constrained by the disciplining 
menace of gender violence, the requirements for proving a "well-founded" 
fear of persecution narrow considerably the ambit of those who can qualify 
as a refugee. The Guidelines explicitly require claimants to establish an 
individual basis for their fear: 
refugee status being an individual remedy, ... the woman will need to show 
that she has a genuine fear of harm, that her gender is the reason for the feared 
harm, that the harm is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution, that there 
is a reasonable possibility for the feared persecution to occur if she is to return 
to her country of origin and she has no reasonable expectation of adequate 
national protection.107 
Having said that, the Guidelines stipulate elsewhere that: 
A gender related claim cannot be rejected simply because the claimant comes 
from a country where women face generalized oppression and violence and the 
claimant's fear of persecution is not identifiable to her on the basis of an 
individualized set of facts.108 
At first blush, these two directives fit awkwardly together. Closer 
scrutiny reveals that they are not irreconcilable propositions. The claimant 
must prove that she has a well-founded fear of persecution as a woman. She 
cannot, however, automatically succeed on the bare argument that "be-
cause I am a woman, I have a well-founded fear of persecution." There are 
two ways in which she can demonstrate that as a woman, she has a well-
founded fear. First, she can use evidence of her own past persecution. As 
Hathaway remarks, past persecution is generally a sufficient, but not 
necessary, indicator of future persecution.109 Second, the claimant can point 
to other "similarly situated" women who have been subject to persecution. 
For example, a Bosnian Muslim woman who fears rape by Serbian forces 
106. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 7. 
107. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). 
108. Id. at 9. This amounts to a gender-specific renunciation of the "particularized evidence 
rule," which was first rejected in Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), 3 F.e. 250 (1990). 
109. HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 88. 
may be able to describe many other women in her region who were raped. 
However, the indiscriminate nature of rape under the circumstances 
precludes any prediction that she will be singled out as a target for rape 
from among other Bosnian Muslim women. In such a case, a Board member 
may legitimately conclude (using the language of the Guidelines) that the 
claimant 
has a genuine fear of harm, that her gender is the reason for the feared harm, 
that the harm is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution, that there is a 
reasonable possibility for the feared persecution to occur if she is to return to 
her country of origin and she has no reasonable expectation of adequate 
national protection. 110 
The conclusion will be valid even though the claimant has fled a place 
where "women face generalized oppression and violence and the claimant's 
fear of persecution is not identifiable to her on the basis of an individualized 
set of facts.'l111 An even starker case might be an Iranian woman subject to 
a law requiring her to veil. Assuming that the law is persecutory, a woman 
will certainly be unable to show that she has been uniquely singled out by 
this law (it applies to all women), yet she can still argue that she has a well-
founded fear of being persecuted by the application of the law to her. 
B. Grounds of Persecution 
Once a woman has cleared the hurdle of proving persecution, she must next 
establish a nexus between the persecution and the listed grounds of race, 
religion, nationality, particular social group, or political opinion. As noted 
earlier, the list does not include gender, and the Guidelines do not add it. 
Instead, the Guidelines encourage decision makers to let gender inform their 
assessment under race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. As a last 
resort, "women" (or some subcategory thereof) might qualify as "a particular 
social group" for purposes of the refugee definition. Bringing women into 
the Convention refugee definition through the particular social group 
category was encouraged by the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1985 in 
Conclusion No. 39, which suggested that "women asylum seekers who face 
harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social 
mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a 'particular 
social group."'112 While the Guidelines quote Conclusion No. 39 with 
110. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 6. 
111. Id. at 8. 
112. Report of the Thirty-Sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, 36th 5ess., 7-18 October 1985, at 36, UN Doc. NAC 96/673, '11 115(4)(k). 
apparent approval,113 they tacitly promote the grounds of political opinion 
or religion as superior routes, asserting that 
[mlost of the gender-specific claims involving fear of persecution for transgress-
ing religious or social norms may be determined on grounds of religion or 
political opinion. Such women may be seen by the governing authorities or 
private citizens as having made a religious or political statement in transgressing 
those norms of their society, even though UNHCR Conclusion No. 39 ... 
contemplates the use of particular social group as an appropriate ground.114 
1. Race 
The UNHCR Handbook advises that for purposes of the refugee definition, 
race "has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of ethnic 
groups that are referred to as 'races' in common usage.'IllS The Guidelines 
observe that race and sex may operate in tandem to explain why a claimant 
fears persecution: 
There may be cases where a woman claims a fear of persecution because of her 
race and her gender. For example, an Asian woman in an African society can be 
persecuted not only for her race, but also for her gender.116 
What remains unclear from this example is whether the Guidelines 
advocate reliance on race excluSively (rather than in tandem with a gender 
based social group) as the grounds for persecution. 
2. Religion 
The Guidelines point out that freedom of religion denotes not only the 
right to practice, but also the right not to practice a religion. Thus, a 
violation of the negative freedom of religion might also constitute persecu-
tion: 
A woman who in an Islamic society, for example, chooses not to subscribe to or 
follow the precepts of a state religion may be at risk of persecution for reasons 
of religion. In the context of the Convention refugee definition, the notion of 
religion may encompass, among other freedoms, the freedom to hold a belief 
system of one's choice or not to hold a particular belief system and the freedom 
to practise a religion of one's choice or not to practise a prescribed religion. In 
certain states, the religion assigns certain roles to women; if a woman does not 
113. See GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 5. 
114. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
115. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 36, at 'II 68. 
116. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 4. 
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fulfil[l) her assigned role and is punished for that, she may have a well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of religion. 117 
The application of this proviso to Nada's case is fairly straightforward. 
By refusing to follow the practices of Islam as dictated by the state, Nada's 
freedom not to practice a prescribed religion (or, more correctly, a 
prescribed version of it) has been violated. lIB 
3. Nationality 
The UNHCR Handbook takes a broad view of nationality, including within 
it "membership of an ethnic or linguistic group.//119 As such, the scope of 
"nationality" may overlap with //race." In addition, some states deprive 
women (but not men) of their formal citizenship if they marry foreign 
nationals. While nationality laws of this nature are discriminatory, the 
Guidelines state that lI[wlhat would constitute good grounds for fearing 
persecution is not the fact of losing her nationality as such . . . but the 
consequences she may suffer as a result.// 120 
4. Political Opinion 
The Guidelines subsequently provide that the same state practice that 
constitutes persecution on grounds of religion might also qualify as 
persecution for reasons of political opinion. As a general matter, a "woman 
who opposes institutionalized discrimination of women, or expresses views 
of independence from male social or cultural dominance in her society, 
may be found to fear persecution for reasons of imputed political opin-
ion."121 
With respect to oppression in a patriarchal theocracy, the Guidelines 
offer decision makers the option of characterizing the persecution as 
political as well as religious: 
The political nature of oppression of women in the context of religious laws and 
ritualization should be recognized. Where tenets of the governing religion in a 
given country require certain kinds of behaviour exclusively from women, 
contrary behaviour may be perceived by the authorities as evidence of an 
117. Id. (emphasis in original). 
118. See infra discussion "Cultural Relativism and Gender Persecution." 
119. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 36, at 'II 74. 
120. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 4. For an illuminating analysis of the detrimental impact of 
discriminatory nationality laws on women and their children, see Note, The Right to 
Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws, 77 M,NN. L. REV. 195 (1992). 
121. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 4. 
unacceptable political opinion that threatens the basic structure from which 
their political power flows. 122 
The Guidelines' suggestion that resistance to patriarchy might be a political 
act is both radical and remarkable. 
The Guidelines also alert decision makers that "where women are 
'assigned' a subordinate status and the authority exercised by men over 
women results in a general oppression of women,"123 women's political 
protest and activism may be manifest in forms that differ from the familiar 
modes expressed by men. For instance, a refusal to wear the veil in a 
fundamentalist Islamic state, or setting up communal kitchens and co-
operative nurseries under the fascist Pinochet regime, could all be seen as 
distinctly womanist brands of political resistance,124 and may be treated as 
such by authorities in the home state, even if they do not conform to the 
types of political activism most commonly displayed by men.125 
5. Social Group 
Using race, religion, nationality, and political opinion as grounds for 
persecution permit the decision maker to accept a claim without explicitly 
acknowledging that the claimant's gender was a reason for the persecution. 
When the fact situation obstinately resists the attempt to avoid specific 
reference to gender, the Guidelines advise decision makers to consider the 
residual category of "particular social group." The scope of this category as 
a basis for persecution has been long contested in Canadian lower courts 
and elsewhere.126 The Guidelines do not engage that debate, though they do 
highlight the family as an example of a particular social group that is more 
or less noncontroversial in Canadian jurisprudence.127 According to 
Hathaway, "whenever there is an indication that the status or activity of a 
claimant's relative is the basis for a risk of persecution, a claim grounded in 
122. Id. (emphasis in original). 
123. Id. (emphasis in original). 
124. See Greatbatch, supra note 9. 
125. Human Rights Watch reports that in Peru, "[aJt times, the violence takes gender specific 
forms, as in the security forces' use of rape against women. At other times, the victim's 
gender does not influence the form of the abuse, but affects its motivation, as in the 
Shining Path's execution of community activists who are women." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
UNTOLD TERROR, supra note 57, at 58. 
126. For a summary of some of the main competing views, see HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 
157-61. 
127. Several Federal Court and CRDD decisions have considered the family to constitute a 
particular social group: AI Busaidy v. Canada (MEIl, (F.CA.) [1992J F.C). No. 26, 
Appeal No. A-46-91; Astudillo v. MEl (1979), 31 NR 121 (FCA); Hristova, Adelina 
Ivanova et al. v. MEl, [1994J F.C). No. 132, Action No. A-487-92 (FCTD). 
family background is properly receivable."128 Recognition of the family as a 
social group can be crucial in situations where women are threatened, 
harassed, and victimized, either as a means of 'punishing' the man by 
violating his female kin, or because the political opinions of their male 
relatives are imputed to the women. Indeed, women's identities, beliefs, and 
status are frequently subsumed under those of their male kin. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to infer that a woman's kinship association with men could 
precipitate her persecution on the basis of imputed political opinion 
regardless of what she herself believes. 
The Ward decision, following close on the heels of the Guidelines, 
deals extensively with the definition of "particular social group." For many 
years, the recurring theme in the commentary has been a struggle between 
two alternatives. The "restrictive" definition would require that a "particular 
social group" be united by some religious, political or national affiliation. 
The end result of this approach would be to render the category of 
"particular social group" otiose, because any individual member of a social 
group so defined would also be able to make a claim based on religion, 
nationality, or political opinion.129 The "liberal" approach advocates the use 
of "particular social group" as a safety net which, according to Arthur 
Helton, "could include all the bases for and types of persecution which an 
imaginative despot might conjure up.'IlJO 
In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that this latter 
formulation "essentially characterizes an association of people as a 'particu-
lar social group' merely by virtue of their common victimization as the 
objects of persecution.',m The putative hazard of this approach would be 
that it obviates the need to enumerate any grounds of persecution. The 
requirement that persecution occur because one is a member of a particular 
social group becomes tautologous if social groups could be constituted 
through the common experience of persecution: one fears persecution 
because one is a member of a particular social group consisting of 
persecuted people. Using the intention of the drafters as the vehicle for his 
conclusion, Justice La Forest writes: 
Although the delegates [who drafted the Convention] inserted the social group 
category in order to cover any possible lacuna left by the other four groups, this 
128. HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 165-66. 
129. As Justice Urie noted in Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, 2 F.C.A. 667 (1990). 
130. Arthur Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for 
Refugee Status 15 COl. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 45 (1983) (quoted in Ward, supra note 11, 
at 729). 
131. Ward, supra note 11, at 729. Justice La Forest was responding both to Professor Helton 
and to lsi Foighel, The Legal Status of the Boat People, 48 NORD. TIDS. FOR INT'L REl. 217, 
222-23. 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that any association bound by some 
common thread is included. If this were the case, the enumeration of these 
bases would have been superfluous; the definition of "refugee" could have been 
limited to individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution without 
more. The drafters' decision to list these bases was intended to function as 
another built-in limitation to the obligations of signatory states.132 
Rather than steer in the direction of the traditional restrictive position, 
however, Justice La forest finds a limiting principle for "particular social 
group" in the notion of anti-discrimination. Noting that the categories of 
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion also figure prominently in 
international and domestic human rights law, Justice La forest considers it 
"appropriate to find inspiration in discrimination concepts."133 Justice La 
forest reviews academic commentary,134 lower court decisions from Canada 135 
and the United States,136 and jurisprudence around the equality provision of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms.137 He then proposes a "social 
group" taxonomy that embraces three alternative classes: 
(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; 
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to 
their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the 
association; and 
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its 
historical permanence.1J6 
for present purposes, the most important fact is that Justice La forest 
cites gender, along with linguistic background and sexual orientation, as 
examples under the first category.139 Recognition of gender as the basis for 
132. Ward, supra note 11, at 732. 
133. Id. at 734. 
134. Id. at 728-31. 
135. Id. at 735-36. 
136. Id. at 736-37. The Court relies in particular on Matter of Acosta, I.A.B., Interim Decision 
2986, 1 Mar. 1985. 
137. Id. at 738. Section 15(1) of the Charter states that Hlelvery individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, 
Appendix II, No. 44, Schedule B, Pt. I. Enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11. 
As amended by the Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983,51/84-102, Schedule, 
in force 21 June 1984. 
138. Ward, supra note 11, at 739. 
139. Id. He gives human rights activists as an example of the second, and fails to give an 
example of the third, though in the course of his application of the test to the facts in 
Ward, he finds that the INLA does not qualify under (3). 
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social group ascription confirms the stance of the Guidelines and displaces 
the Federal Court of Appeal's restrictive ruling in Ward, that particular social 
groups must contain "members . . . united in a stable association with 
common purposes."140 It also effectively overrules at least one CRDD 
decision where the panel found the category "women" too amorphous to 
constitute a "particular" social group.141 
Linking the concept of "particular social group" to general principles of 
anti-discrimination and Section 15 of the Charter places the classification of 
women as a particular social group in the realm of the incontrovertible. 
After a", if the existence of sex discrimination is as much beyond serious 
debate as racism, how could anyone object to recognizing persecution on 
grounds of gender when the Convention definition already does so for 
race?142 
This recognition of women as a social group is especially valuable in 
cases where women claim refugee status because of the absence of state 
protection from domestic violence. By definition, a" victims of crime 
experience a failure of state protection, yet victims of crime do not qualify 
as refugees per se. What distingUishes women in Dularie's situation is that 
the nature of the abuse and the chronic failure of state protection evince and 
sustain the unequal status of women in society. Both the violence commit-
ted against women in the home and the ineptitude of the state in combatting 
the phenomenon are systemic, systematic, and emerge out of the deeply 
rooted subordination of women. In its report entitled Violence Against the 
Women in the Family, the UN Centre for Social Development and 
Humanitarian Affairs surveyed a wealth of literature and came to the 
following conclusion about the causes of domestic violence: 
In sum, it would appear that there is no simple explanation for violence against 
women in the home. Certainly, any explanation must go beyond the individual 
characteristics of the man, the woman and the family and look to the structure 
of relationships and the role of society in underpinning that structure. In the end 
analYSiS, it is perhaps best to conclude that violence against wives is a function 
of the belief fostered in all cultures, that men are superior and that the women 
140. Ward (FCA), supra note 127, at 689 (per MacGuigan J., dissenting on other grounds). 
141. [1992J CRDD No. 318, No. T92-03227 (18 Nov. 1992) (Davis & Woloschuk, J.J.). The 
claimant was an Ecuadoran woman who had been repeatedly brutalized by her 
husband. The police refused to protect her. The tribunal determined, inter alia, that 
women did not constitute a particular social group. 
142. Celina Romany makes a parallel point about international human rights law when she 
states that "a feminist critique must ask why white supremacy belongs to [the 
international] community and male supremacy belongs to the individual state." Celina 
Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the PublidPrivate 
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 
53, at 89-90. 
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they live with are their possessions or chattels that they can treat as they wish 
and as they consider appropriate .... 
The collected scholarship that seeks to explain violence against women in the 
home indicates that the explanation is complex and certainly multi-factorial. 
Any explanation must, however, be seen against a background of gender 
inequality, wherein the victim of such violence is most often the woman and 
perpetrator most often the man and wherein the structures of society-be they 
economic, political or legal-act to confirm this inequality.143 
Perhaps an apt way of restating the report's conclusion is to depict the 
position of women in the national community as "not just precarious," 
because "there is also an element of fundamental marginalization which 
distinguishes them from other persons at risk of serious harm."144 That is to 
say, women as a group manifest the qualities that Hathaway describes as 
constitutive of refugees as a category. 
Though Ward's anti-discrimination focus provides a cogent rationale 
for the inclusion of women as a particular social group, it offers no clues 
about whether or how to delineate the boundaries of a gender-defined 
social group in a given case. 
When a woman is threatened with "dowry burning," or battered by her 
spouse, or forced to enter an arranged marriage, or faces the prospect of 
genital mutilation, the grounds of religion or political opinion will likely 
prove inapposite to her refugee claim. In cases where neither law nor 
religion dictate the measures in question, yet state protection is not 
forthcoming, classifying women as a particular social group category may 
be the claimant's only option. For, as Lori Heise explains, "[i]n all these 
instances, women are targets of violence because of their sex. This is not 
random violence; the risk factor is being female."145 
In Dularie's case, where a Trinidadian woman is abused by her male 
partner in a context of state indifference, the Guidelines accept that her 
gender may form the basis for social group ascription, but they evade the 
important question of how to circumscribe the group. In theory, the social 
group could simply be "women," "Trinidadian women," "Trinidadian 
women with male partners," or "Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse," 
because all persons in this category are vulnerable to the type of persecu-
tion. In Mayers and Marcel v. MEI,146 a case decided by the Federal Court of 
143. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVElOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, ViOlENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMilY 
33 (1989) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Violence Against Women in the Family]. 
144. HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 135. 
145. Lori Heise, Crimes of Gender, 2 WORLDWATCH 12 (1989), cited in GUIDELINES, supra note 3, 
at 15 n.10. 
146. Mayers & Marcel v. MEl, supra note 99. 
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Appeal prior to the Guidelines, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that there 
was some evidence upon which a tribunal might find that the appellant 
belonged to a social group comprised of "Trinidadian women subject to 
wife abuse." The Federal Court of Appeal's precedent in Mayers doubtless 
influenced the panel's approach in the subsequent case of a Zimbabwean 
girl forced into a polygamous marriage with an abusive husband. The panel 
defined the particular social group to which she belonged as "unprotected 
Zimbabwean women or girls subject to wife abuse."147 
However one defines the particular social group, the number of women 
included in it will likely be sizable. The Guidelines emphasize that, just as 
the prevalence of domestic violence is irrelevant to its character as 
persecution, so to is the size of the social group irrelevant to the question of 
whether the designated class is a "particular social group." Yet, the 
Guidelines tacitly endorse the trend toward limiting the size of the group as 
much as possible: 
[tlhe fact that the particular social group consists of large numbers of the female 
population in the country concerned is irrelevant-race, religion, nationality 
and political opinion are also characteristics that are shared by large numbers of 
people. 
[Wlhat is relevant is evidence that the particular social group suffers or fears to 
suffer severe discrimination or harsh and inhuman treatment that is distin-
guished from the situation of the general population, or from other women. 
[Al sub-group of women can be identified by reference to the fact of their 
exposure or vulnerability for physical, cultural or other reasons, to violence, 
including domestic violence, in an environment that denies them protection. 
These women face violence amounting to persecution, because of their 
particular vulnerability as women in their societies and because they are so 
unprotected. 148 
This construction of a sub-group of women along the lines of "women 
from country X who are subject to wife abuse" raises several problems. First, 
it contains the requirement of past persecution in the definition of the social 
group, despite the general and well-accepted principle in refugee jurispru-
dence that past persecution is not a prerequisite to establishing a well 
founded fear of persecution.149 Second, defining a group by reference to the 
common experience of a particular form of persecution is tautological. 
Finally, it is evasive and misleading to refer to a sub-group of women (such 
as "battered Trinidadian women") who face persecution because they are 
147. CRDD No. U92-06668, supra note 67. 
148. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
149. See HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 87. 
women and because they are so unprotected. It is because they are women 
that they are so unprotected. In other words, to say that one is a woman is 
to say that one is vulnerable to abuse committed with impunity in the 
"private" sphere.1so Thus, it should not be necessary to go further than to 
describe the category as "women" simpliciter. Indeed, this appears to be the 
import of Ward. Justice La Forest lists gender without qualifiers or adjectives 
as the basis of social group ascription because it is an innate or unchange-
able characteristic; one could not describe "women-who-are-subject-to-
wife-abuse" as an innate or unchangeable characteristic. More importantly, 
when one applies principles of anti-discrimination, it seems more sensible 
to describe groups in terms of vulnerability to persecution in general, rather 
than in terms of vulnerability to a particular type of persecution. To the 
extent that Ward contemplates gender as a category, it may be that this 
aspect of the Guidelines has been effectively superseded by the dictum of 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Having said this, designating "women" as the appropriate social group 
does not lead inexorably to the consequence that all women are automati-
cally entitled to refugee status. As noted earlier, whether the basis of the 
persecution is membership in a particular social group or some other 
ground, a claimant will still be required to show that she genUinely fears 
persecution and that her fear is objectively "well-founded." How this will 
play out in practice can only be a matter of speculation at present. Where 
the claim is centered on the failure of state protection, the fact that the 
claimant is a woman, in a culture where the statistical odds of her being 
abused are significant, may well be treated as insufficient to establish a 
genuine fear of serious harm and/or a reasonable possibility of future harm. 
In any event, the prevalence of violence against women in the claimant's 
country of origin will make it all the more likely that the claimant has, in 
fact, experienced the maltreatment she fears. On the other hand, where the 
claimant flees the prospect of genital mutilation, or dowry burning, it would 
150. Pamela Goldberg defends the "women who are battered and have no recourse to state 
protection" formulation on the basis that "[i]n most instances, if that same woman were 
assaulted on the street by an unknown assailant she would receive police assistance and 
could, if the assailant were found, prosecute him in criminal court for his violence. 
Rather, it is because her attacker is her husband, boyfriend, or other male intimate that 
the state is refusing to grant her protection. This makes her vulnerable not because she 
is a woman, but because she is a woman who is prey to a male intimate." Goldberg, 
supra note 13, at 597-98. Goldberg's explanation rationalizes rather than resolves the 
dilemma of incorporating past persecution into the definition. At most, the fact that her 
attacker is her male partner enhances the well-founded ness of her fear of future abuse. 
Moreover, her speculation on the protection available to women assaulted by strangers 
is pure conjecture, and might actually be wrong whenever sexual assault is at issue. 
Finally, it is not clear what motivates the narrow definition of a social group. After all, 
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion are all broadly defined groups. 
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be absurd to require that she have experienced the persecution she flees in 
order to validate her apprehension as "well-founded." 
C. Procedural Issues 
As in other juridical fora, women who base their claim on past incidents of 
sexual abuse may be confronted with attacks on their credibility or moral 
rectitude. Other factors complicate the situation for women refugee claim-
ants, some of which the Guidelines address. The Guidelines begin with the 
general proposition that women refugee claimants "face special problems in 
demonstrating that their claims are credible and trustworthy."ISI Members 
are advised to familiarize themselves with the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, 
which contain greater detail on gender-sensitivity in a cross-cultural con-
text. For example, the UNHCR Gender Guidelines counsel interviewers to 
Be aware of gender differences in communication, particularly regarding non-
verbal communications. As an interviewer, avoid intimidating gestures that 
inhibit responses. In assessing the credibility of the female applicant, for 
example, do not judge it on the basis of such Western cultural values as the 
ability to maintain eye contact. 152 
The Canadian Guidelines observe that "[wlomen from societies where 
the preservation of one's virginity or marital dignity is the cultural norm may 
be reluctant to disclose their sad experiences of sexual violence in order to 
keep their shame to themselves alone and not dishonor their family or 
community," and may exhibit symptoms consistent with rape trauma 
syndrome.1S3 The UNHCR Gender Guidelines advise interviewers to give 
time and space to the woman applicant, so that she may develop a rapport 
with the interviewer that will enable her to recount her experiences. 
Interviewers are advised not to ask for details of sexual abuse-lithe 
important thing in establishing a well-founded fear of persecution is to 
establish that some form of it has occurred." IS4 Also, the UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines caution that sexual assault survivors may exhibit symptoms 
consistent with rape trauma syndrome and should be treated with sensitiv-
ity. The UNHCR Gender Guidelines explain that the symptoms can include 
1 51 . GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 9. 
152. UNHCR GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at '1\ 72. 
153. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 9. The stigma described in the Guidelines is probably a 
matter of degree rather than kind. Certainly Anglo-European culture stigmatizes women 
who allege that they were sexually assaulted. 
154. UNHCR GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at '1\ 72. 
"persistent fear, a loss of self-confidence and self-esteem, difficulty in 
concentration, an attitude of self-blame, a pervasive feeling of loss of 
control, and memory loss or distortion,"lss none of which should be 
misconstrued as proof of non-credibility. The Guidelines also raise the 
possibility of providing claimants with the option of presenting their 
evidence by affidavit, videotape, or before members specially trained in 
dealing with violence against women, though this has not been imple-
mented to date. 
A final observation in the Guidelines, about proving gender-specific 
persecution, concerns the dearth of documentary evidence about country 
conditions relevant to women's situations. Country reports about the 
general human rights situation from sources such as the us State Depart-
ment, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International are frequently 
published, but until recently have not addressed gender-related persecution. 
The Guidelines caution decisionmakers that, where "a gender-related claim 
involves threats of or actual sexual violence at the hands of authorities (or 
private citizens not susceptible to state control), the claimant may have 
difficulties in substantiating her claim with any 'statistical data' on the 
incidence of sexual violence in her country of origin."ls6 
The UNHCR Gender Guidelines suggest that the "recruitment and 
training of female interpreters is a precondition for the most effective 
interviewing."ls7 The importance of having competent and sensitive 
decision makers cannot be overstated-at least one unsuccessful refugee 
claim was quashed on judicial review because of the sexist bias and 
demeaning behaviour displayed by the panel toward a female Somali 
claimant.158 All of this only evinces the reality that the Guidelines are words 
on paper, and words can only be translated into deed by willing interpreters. 
D. Flaws and Gaps in the Guidelines 
While the Guidelines attempt to be comprehensive in their treatment of the 
relevance of gender, certain significant omissions remain that could under-
mine the success of genuine claimants. 
On the substantive side, the "internal flight alternative" rule (a standard 
in refugee determination) stipulates that if a claimant could have avoided 
155. Id. 
156. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 8. 
157. UNHCR GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, 'Il 41. 
158. Yusuf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1992) 1 F.e. 629, 133 
N.R. 391 (F.e.A.). 
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persecution by moving to another part of her country of origin, she is not a 
refugee from that country.159 The Guidelines instruct decisionmakers to take 
into account the possibility of internal flight as an effective recourse when 
assessing the validity of the claimant's fear of persecution,160 but they do not 
elaborate. There is a danger that some decisionmakers may conclude that a 
woman who was beaten by her husband and could not obtain police 
protection, or who was being forced into a marriage she did not want, 
simply could have moved to another region of her country and need not 
have fled to Canada. This may be an option in some countries and in some 
cases, but not in others. Evidence about the social or phYSical impossibility 
of women living safely apart from their husbands and kin in their countries 
of origin may be necessary to counteract potentially adverse assumptions 
about the practical availability of the internal flight alternative. 
Another basis upon which one may be denied refugee status is 
cessation due to change of circumstances.161 If the conditions giving rise to 
the persecution in the country of origin have been resolved since the 
claimant fled and protection is now viable in the refugee's country of origin, 
the claim may be denied. However, a refugee claimant can still respond that 
she continues to suffer the effects of past persecution, and argue that there 
exist "compelling reasons" not to apply the cessation clause to her. The 
Guidelines do not mention cessation at all and thus do not offer any advice 
to decisionmakers on the gendered aspects of the effects of a compelling 
reasons" defense to a cessation determination. 
One hypothetical illustration where this might be germane is in the case 
of survivors of the systematic rape of women from opposing ethnic or 
religious groups in the former Yugoslavia. Suppose a Muslim survivor of 
rape by Serb militia manages to make it to Canada and launch a refugee 
claim. Before her claim is adjudicated, the war is settled and her region is 
no longer under occupation. Should the cessation clause apply? Arguably, it 
would be highly relevant to consider that Muslim women, who have been 
sexually assaulted by enemy forces, may be ostracized by members of their 
own family, faith, and community because they have been "defiled." Even 
though the risk of further persecution is ostenSibly eliminated, the stigmati-
zation of a survivor by her own people might eliminate any real prospect of 
reintegrating into that SOciety. Thus, the effects of past sexual persecution 
might furnish a compelling reason why some women's ability to return to 
159. See HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 133-34 and cases cited therein. 
160. GUIDElINES, supra note 3, at 10. 
161 . Immigration Ad, § 2(2)(e). 
their community distinguish them from male claimants who have been 
persecuted in different ways.162 By failing to consider the way gender affects 
both the availability of the internal flight alternative and the ability of 
sexually abused women to return to their communities, the Guidelines 
leave gaps that have the potential of being filled with sexist assumptions that 
ultimately subvert the spirit and intent of the Guidelines. 
On the procedural side, although the Guidelines refer to the possibility 
that "women who have suffered domestic violence may also be reluctant to 
testify," they do not advert to the explanation that the perpetrator might also 
be claiming refugee status. The Convention Refugee Determination Rules163 
require that refugee claims of spouses be processed jointly unless one of the 
parties applies for severance and provides reasons. As David Matas 
contends, the advantage of joinder is efficiency, but there is also a danger 
that the woman's claim will be submerged in the claim of her husband, with 
the result that "there is a tendency for claims of the whole fami Iy to succeed 
or fail based on the success or failure of the claim of the husband."164 
The problem becomes acute where the woman has a separate, gender-
specific aspect to her claim. If the male claimant has abused his wife, she 
will be unable to raise it in a joint hearing for obvious reasons. Even where 
a woman has been the victim of sexual abuse by others, she may be 
reluctant to disclose the incident(s) in front of her husband, if he does not 
know, or he may not wish her to reveal it for fear of being "shamed." While 
the woman can request severance, she will be obliged to supply reasons, 
which might consist of the very information she or her husband wish to 
suppress.16S The Guidelines are silent on this issue; Matas recommends that 
a rule of automatic severance of claims with the option of joinder would 
offer better protection to married women making refugee claims. 
162. In CRDD No. 15, No. C91-00123 (12 Feb. 1992) (E.D. Pask & J. Lo), the panel 
determined that "a well founded fear of persecution from the Guatemalan military no 
longer exists because of the claimant's political opinion or her membership in a 
particular social group, that is, the family of V.H." The panel took into account, 
however, the traumatic events experienced by the claimant (raped at fifteen by 
guerrillas in the presence of her mother and a nephew, mother forced to serve as a guide 
for guerrillas, friends and family members killed by military or guerrillas) and found it 
understandable that the claimant would "believe that she is at risk forever because of 
the minute amount of knowledge that she has." The panel concluded that the claimant 
had "compelling reasons ariSing out of previous persecution" for refusing to avail herself 
of the protection of Guatemala, and thus had not ceased to be a refugee. 
163. Registration SOR!93-45, 28 Jan. 1993, C. Gaz. Pt. II, Vol. 127, No.3, Rule 10. 
164. David Matas, Gender and Refugee Law, GENDER ISSUES AND REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT IMPLICA-
TIONS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 1003, 1010. 
165. Id. at 1012. 
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III. REPRESENTING GENDER PERSECUTION 
Debates about the Guidelines tend to elicit two lines of objection: the 
Guidelines either go too far in imposing "Western"166 values on other 
cultures, or "don't go far enough" because they fail to add gender explicitly 
to the refugee taxonomy. The former argument often deploys "cultural 
imperialism" as its vehicle, while the latter articulates a feminist concern 
about the adequacy of the interpretive strategy adopted by the Guidelines. 
This section considers both of these critiques and adds a third concern 
about the potential friction generated when feminist discourse is grafted 
onto refugee discourse. 
A. Cultural Relativism and Gender Persecution 
The Guidelines invoke a variety of international legal instruments, prohibit-
ing sex discrimination and guaranteeing equal status to men and women to 
deflect the rhetorical queries of critics, such as Bernard Valcourt, who was 
Minister of Employment and Immigration at the time the Guidelines were 
issued. Valcourt initially resisted the calls to recognize gender persecution 
as the basis of a refugee claim by invoking the spectre of cultural 
imperialism: 
But will Canada act as an imperialist country and impose its values on other 
countries around the world? ... I don't think that Canada should unilaterally try 
to impose its values on other countries regarding laws of general application. 167 
Stripped of its rhetorical flourish, Valcourt's argument effectively asserts 
that the legal institutions of Canadian patriarchy ought to respect the 
patriarchical customs and laws of other states. 1GB In response to this line of 
objection, the Guidelines incorporate international norms to bolster the 
proposition that characterizing certain forms of sex-based discrimination 
166. I use the term "Western" advisedly and metaphorically. It connotes an East/VVest 
ideological split which strikes me as inaccurate; the "North/South" dichotomy is also 
problematic, however, insofar as it is organized along an economic gradient which is 
presumed to carry cultural connotations as well. 
167. Quoted in Estanislao Oziewicz, No Plan to Accept Victims of Sex Bias, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL, 16 Jan. 1993, at A6. 
168. Perhaps the unarticulated corollary was that other states ought to extend the same 
deference to Canadian manifestations of patriarchal oppression. For a provocative 
discussion of the issue of cultural relativism, see Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law, 
and Cultural Relativism in France: the Case of Excision, SIGNS 939 (Summer 1994). 
and oppression as persecution represents not only Canada's view, but also 
that of the international community. If a Kurd comes to Canada claiming 
that he was whipped by Iraqi police interrogators for his political activities, 
Canada does not consider whether whipping is a time honor.ed tradition in 
the man's country of origin, or whether the assertion of Kurdish nationalism 
is against the law in Iraq. Canada does not worry about offending the 
sensibilities of states that flog people because of their ethnicity or political 
opinions when Canada declares that the claimant was persecuted. Chair 
Mawani notes: "This is not simply a matter of imposing western standards 
on other countries. It is a matter of respecting internationally accepted 
human rights standards."169 Though foreign policy considerations often 
pollute the refugee determination process,170 as a matter of principle, 
refugee law proceeds from the ineluctable fact that states will necessarily 
draw judgments about the way other states treat their nationals, including 
women nationals. 
It is important to recognize that reliance on international standards cuts 
both ways. As the Guidelines state in relation to discrimination, a "woman's 
claim to Convention refugee status cannot be based solely on the fact that 
she is subject to a national policy or law to which she objects."171 The 
conduct must violate international standards of human rights which, among 
other things, tend to represent the views of an elite group of first world men 
about what constitute fundamental human rights.172 
In Nada's case, then, it should not matter that the Saudi government 
takes the position that proscribing women's dress and conduct is integral to 
its conception of Islam, if Nada experiences these laws as oppressive and 
international norms supply "objective" validation of her subjective experi-
ence of persecution. One can envisage 'similar results when genital 
mutilation or dowry burning are submitted to scrutiny. 
While this approach seems tidy enough, the issue is both simpler and 
more complicated than the Guidelines acknowledge. On the one hand, no 
169. Immigration and Refugee Board, "News Release," 9 Mar. 1993. The use of international 
standards is problematic however, in that not all countries have ratified them (especially 
the "problem countries") but also because they.represent at best a consensus among 
powerful people (usually men) about what constitutes a violation of a fundamental 
human right, and may ignore the experience of oppression of those with no voice to 
express themselves or make themselves heard. 
170. "Because a finding that the claimant faces a risk of persecution is perceived to imply 
censure of the state of origin, there is always a risk that concern for the protection of 
refugees may be subordinated to foreign poliCy concerns." HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 
82. 
171. GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 8. 
172. CEDAWand the recent Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women are 
possible exceptions. 
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question of imposing Western values on other countries need arise at all, 
because the recipient country plays a relatively passive role in asylum 
claims. Individuals arrive on Canada's doorstep (figuratively or literally) 
asking for admission, and Canada says yes or no. A positive decision entails 
no consequences for the country of origin. Declaring a woman to be a 
refugee from Saudi Arabia is not tantamount to dispatching troops to Saudi 
Arabia to compel it to revise its laws, policies, or practices. A finding of 
refugee status does not reverberate in the official domain of international 
human rights law. At best, countries are embarrassed when their citizens are 
recognized as refugees elsewhere. Mostly, they are indifferent, dismissive, 
or disdainful. 
In sum, accusations of cultural relativism from state to state need not be 
daunting. After all, why should Saudi Arabia's explanation about why it 
treats women in a given way occupy a privileged position over Nada's own 
experiences ofthat treatment? Similarly, the argument that Western feminists 
falsely universalize their own "gynocentrism" by supporting Nada's claim 
lacks credibility. Many women may endorse the normative basis of laws 
regulating their dress and comportment, and not experience the restrictions 
as persecutory; still others don the veil as part of an anti-colonialist strategy 
of protest and resistance.173 Nevertheless, it remains that this woman felt 
persecuted by Saudi restrictions and has come forward saying so. The lively 
debate among feminists about differences across cultures, about the perils of 
imposing "Western" notions of feminism on the experiences of other 
women, and about how international human rights law should be 
reconfigured-if at all-to account for this, do not impinge directly on the 
refugee determination process. 
Of greater concern to me, however, is the possible appropriation of 
Nada's experience in ways that subvert her own self-understanding as an 
Arab, Muslim woman. The media coverage of Nada's plight, though 
sympathetic to her, inevitably (if unwittingly) played to negative stereotypes 
about Islam and Arab culture. According to her lawyer, Nada herself was 
dismayed and alienated by this depiction of her religion and her culture in 
this way. While it is true that she opposed the totalizing rendition of Islam 
imposed upon her by the Saudi government and its agents, it is far from 
evident that she saw misogyny in Islamic practice or Arab culture as either 
173. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: ConSidering the Differ-
ences, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1527 (1992); Arlene McLeod, Hegemonic Relations and 
Gender Resistance: The New Veiling as Accommodating Protest in Cairo, 17 SIGNS 533 
(1993); Nayereh Tohidi, Gender and Islamic Fundamentalism in THIRD WORLD WOMEN 
AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 251-65 (Chandra Mohanty et al. eds., 1991). 
inherent or inexorable. There are many Muslim feminists who believe 
otherwise,174 and through internal critique and interpretation refuse to 
"internalize an absolute version of the majority religion, which cannot 
admit that it is a negotiated mistranslation.1I175 In this they are similar to 
committed Jewish and Christian feminists, or Catholic lesbians and gays. 
The reference here is to people whose self-definition might strike outsiders 
as oxymoronic because they reject the sexism or heterosexism of their 
religious faith as essential, and prefer to understand it as the artifact of 
patriarchal heterosexist power relations. 
The point is that the Muslim Arab woman remains both Muslim and 
Arab even as the refugee determination system abstracts her gender identity 
in order to define her as a victim of persecution. If one accepts the 
contemporary insight that identity is fragmented, then it follows that every 
individual must be characterized differently in terms of power relations, 
depending on the feature under scrutiny.176 For the refugee determination 
process (or the media or Western feminists) to construct Nada as a victim of 
Islam, or a victim of Arab culture, strikes me as an alienating message that 
pits Nada qua woman against Nada the Arab and Nada the Muslim. 
For this reason, the Guidelines' suggestion that a woman in Nada's 
position ought to be depicted as fearing persecution on the basis of religion 
may be too simplistic, at least to the extent that this may not comport with 
her claim that it is not Islam per se that is the problem, but rather the 
"interpretations and discursive uses of Islam"177 by the state. In this case, she 
may see her oppressor as the state, and define the basis of her persecution 
as a political opinion. On the other hand, if Nada renounces Islam because 
she accepts the state's interpretation as accurate, the framing of her claim 
may well name Islam as the agent of her oppression. This, in turn, raises the 
question of whether the basis of a given refugee claim ought to "float" in 
174. For recent scholarship by Muslim feminists, see WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PERCEPTIONS, 
REALITIES AND STRUGGLES FOR LIBERATION (Haleh Afshar ed., 1993); LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND 
GENDER IN ISlAM (1992); Farida Shaheed, Controlled or Autonomous: Identity and the 
Experience of the Network, Women Living under Muslim Laws, SIGNS 997 (Summer 
1994). 
175. Gayatri Spivak, Acting BitS/Identity Talk, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 770, 800 (1992). Spivak was 
speaking in the context of Hinduism, but the same could be said of Islam or any other 
enforced orthodoxy. 
176. For example, I may be privileged as a white person, disadvantaged as a woman, 
comfortably located in my middle class status, and somewhere in the middle of a 
complicated ethno-religious hierarchy as a Jew. Where I am situated in any given 
moment may vary with the particular context in which I am operating and the criteria 
against which I am being scrutinized. 
177. Annie Bunting, Theorizing Women's Cultural Diversity in Feminist International Human 
Rights Strategies, 20 J. L. & SOC'Y 6, 14 (1993). 
accordance with the claimant's own construction of her experience.178 
While this approach is certainly compatible with a woman-centered 
epistemology, integrating it into the "objective" (and objectifying) standards 
employed in refugee law may prove problematic. Realistically, one is 
unlikely to observe such nuances emerging in refugee jurisprudence. Its 
significance may be greatest in the lawyer-client relationship (ifthe claimant 
is fortunate enough to be represented), at the point where the two struggle 
with choices about how to represent the woman's experience into a 
juridically cognizable form. 
B. Reinterpretation Versus Accretion 
As noted earlier, the feature of the Guidelines which has proved most vexing 
to many commentators, refugee activists, and feminists is their failure to 
simply add gender (or sex) to the list of grounds of persecution.179 Because 
only the government possesses jurisdiction to amend the refugee definition 
set out in the Immigration Act, this cannot be held against the IRB, which 
produced the Guidelines. As it happened, opposition NDP Member of 
Parliament, Dan Heap, introduced a private members bill on 27 April 1993 
to do just that. His proposed amendment would have defined a refugee as 
one who flees 
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, sex, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 
opinion. IDo 
One could envisage the same proposal being made in the international 
arena with respect to amending the Convention itself, though Hathaway 
makes the compelling argument that reopening the Convention for revision, 
at a time of escalating antipathy and xenophobia toward refugees, could 
prove dangerous and self-defeating. 
The claim that reinterpreting the existing refugee definition is inferior to 
adding gender as a ground of persecution must, in my view, sustain the 
following two propositions. First, adding gender will protect a greater range 
178. As a practical matter, most people making refugee claims in Canada are so bewildered 
and alienated that they rely heavily on lawyers, who perforce must act as cultural 
mediators in translating the claimant's story into a cognizable claim that will appeal to 
the world view of the Board. It would not be surprising if the complexity of the 
claimant's self-understanding gets lost in the process. 
179. See, e.g., Linda Hossie, For Women, Oppression is Often a Way of Life, GLOBE AND MAIL, 
5 Feb. 1993, atA15. 
180. Bill C-424, 3rd Sess. 34th ParI., 40-41-42 Eliz. II, 1991-92-93. The Bill, like most private 
members bills by opposition members, did not get past first reading. 
of gender-based claims than utilizing the existing grounds along the lines 
commended by the Guidelines. Second, the perils of the discursive strategy 
of reinterpretation are greater than those posed by the explicit addition of 
gender. 
On the first issue, journalist Linda Hossie forcefully advances an 
argument in favor of altering the definition to explicitly enumerate gender 
rather than dealing with gender persecution through the existing definition: 
The problem with the draft guidelines, meanwhile, is that they treat women's 
refugee problems as a subtle variation of men's. But the situation of women is 
unique. 
Forced abortion, forced pregnancy, ritual (and disabling) clitoridectomy-all of 
which are appallingly common-are forms of persecution that have no parallel 
in men's experience. To oblige women seeking asylum to prove that such 
treatment is just a variation of the oppression faced by men is illogical and-
when you get right down to it-discriminatory. 
Even when women face routine political, religious or ethnic persecution, it is 
compounded by their almost universal second-class status. Women draw the ire 
of sexist cultures much more readily than do men, and for much less 
provocative actions. 
The reason that women's groups around the world are fighting to have sexually 
based persecution made a legal basis for refugee claims, to have rape declared 
a war crime and to have women's rights declared human rights, is to focus 
attention on the systemic, daily, inescapable oppression of women's normal 
lives in most countries .... 
There is nothing to stop Canada from broadening its own legal definition to 
include those suffering sex-based persecution. Nothing but bias. t8t 
I believe that Hossie is alerting us to the critical importance of naming 
what is done to women as "gender persecution" and not masking it with 
some other label. Not naming it for what it is trivializes gender persecution 
as less damaging than race or religious persecution, and perpetuates the 
invisibility of its victims. For instance, the suggestion that Nada was 
persecuted simply because she would not accede to the tenets of the 
dominant view of her religion does seem to occlude the critical dimension 
of gender as a reason for persecution. 
Mattie Stevens also asserts unequivocally that anything short of adding 
gender to the categories of the refugee definition is inadequate.182 Although 
181. Hossie, supra note 179. 
182. Mattie Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as 
a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNEll J. L. & PUB. POL'y 179 (1993). 
writing in the American context, she does advert to the Guidelines' 
approach in her analysis, before coming to the following conclusion: 
The current categories of the refugee definition do not accommodate gender-
specific persecution. Nor does the existing immigration adjudicatory structure 
see and understand the situation of women. No cohesive framework exists 
within which to evaluate gender-specific claims. United States law could 
attempt to incorporate the claims of women into the [Convention) Protocol's 
categories, but that would not recognize the fact that the type of persecution 
women face is different from that of men. Nor would it compensate for the 
decidedly white, male slant of the current definition, or the biases of the 
immigration judges and the [Bureau of Immigration Appeals). Thus, legislators 
must create a separate category.183 
Despite the vigor of Stevens' rhetoric, she does not provide any scenario 
of gender persecution that would be rejected under the Guidelines' 
approach, but would succeed if gender were an enumerated category. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that the biases Stevens attributes to refugee 
decisionmakers could be transformed by the addition of a single word to the 
refugee definition. If the decision makers are as resistant as she suggests, they 
could probably subvert any language one might insert into the definition. If 
it follows from this that adding gender is not sufficient in the absence of 
competent and sensitive decisionmakers, one might query whether it is 
even necessary if decisionmakers possess the will and ability to interpret the 
existing definition in a gender-sensitive manner. 
A more serious defect in Stevens' and Hossie's proposals to add gender 
as a ground of persecution subsists in their tacit assumption that every case 
of gender persecution is persecution because of gender. Were this proposi-
tion true, then no case of gender persecution could be properly addressed 
without adding gender (or sex) as a sixth category of persecution, and doing 
so would resolve every situation in which gender is relevant. In my view, 
however, it is a mistake to equate "gender persecution" with "persecution 
on grounds of gender," or "persecution because of gender." 
"Gender persecution" includes, but is not limited to, "persecution 
because of gender." Certainly, gender may explain why a woman was 
persecuted. Gender may also determine the form that persecution takes. 
Sometimes, it may even be a risk factor that makes a woman's fear of 
persecution more well-founded than that of a man in similar circum-
stances.184 Though one or more of these links between gender and 
183. Id. at 214-15. 
184. In China, parents who have more than one child face the risk of forced sterilization. 
Women are more likely than men to be forcibly sterilized, though a husband may be 
persecution may be present simultaneously in a given case, they are not 
synonymous. The idea of women being persecuted as women is not the 
same as women being persecuted because they are women. The former 
addresses forms of persecution that are gender-specific. Understanding the 
ways in which women are violated as women is critical to naming as 
persecution things that are done only or mostly to women and not to men. 
To say that the claimant fears persecution because she is a woman addresses 
a causal relation between gender and persecution. 
For example, one may be persecuted as a woman (e.g., raped) for 
reasons unrelated to gender (e.g., membership in an opposition political 
party), not persecuted as a woman but still because of gender (e.g., flogged 
for refusing to wear a veil),185 and persecuted as and because one is a 
woman (e.g., genital mutilation). All three of these cases present examples 
of gender persecution, but it does not follow that each of them ought to be 
framed as persecution on grounds of gender, whether gender is propounded 
as a separate ground of persecution or as a particular social group. In 
particular, it is more apt to describe the first claimant as one who fears 
persecution on the basis of a political opinion, not gender. Recognizing rape 
as a type of torture permits the conclusion that what was done to the 
claimant was indeed persecution. 
Why insist on these apparently semantic distinctions? First, it is 
important to be clear on the relationship between gender and the elements 
of the refugee definition. If a man's testicles are subjected to electric shocks, 
the victim is certainly being tortured in a gender-specific way, but it does not 
follow that he is being persecuted on grounds of gender. Gender-related 
violations do not necessarily constitute persecution because of gender. 
Second, it is important to avoid the twin extremes of collapsing every 
persecution of women into the category of "persecution on grounds of 
gender," versus submerging the gender component entirely under other 
labels. The trouble with framing any persecution of women as "persecution 
because of gender" is that it can reinforce women's marginalization by 
implying that only men have political opinions, only men are activated by 
religion, only men have racial presence, etc. In other words, it may create 
vulnerable if his wife is unable to undergo the procedure. Thus, parents with more than 
one child may both fear forced sterilization, but the mother'S fear might be more "well 
founded" than the father's. In this way, gender informs the assessment of whether the 
fear is "well-founded." This possibility was not considered in either Cheung, supra note 
68, or Chan, supra note 69. 
185. Another illustration would be wife battering. I anticipate that some would consider the 
battered woman to be persecuted as a woman in the sense that domestic violence is 
virtually always inflicted by a man on a woman. In my opinion, however, there is 
nothing inherently gender-specific about being beat up. 
and sustain the stereotype that men "own" the categories of oppression that 
are not explicitly "gendrified." On the other hand, the trouble with not 
acknowledging gender as a discrete basis of persecution is that it masks the 
specificity of women's oppression. The formal distinctions drawn here are 
intended to mediate between these two poles, in the hopes of minimizing 
the dangers attendant upon a wholesale application of either one. For their 
part, the Guidelines provide illustrations of the manifold ways in which 
gender affect both the form of and reasons for persecution, but the 
Guidelines do not attend to the distinction in the analytical framework 
suggested for assessing gender-based claims. 
While I share a sense of dissatisfaction about the Guidelines' tacit 
suggestion to employ religion, race, or nationality as devices to avoid 
dealing expressly with gender, there is a strong argument that 'political 
opinion' may well include women's opposition to extreme, institutionalized 
discrimination. Political opinion as a ground of persecution does not suffer 
from the same partiality as do religion or race. That is, it does not address 
only a single aspect of persecution experienced by the woman claimant. 
Instead, it equates resistance to gender oppression with a political opinion, 
thus seizing the language of liberal democratic rights discourse and re-
fashioning it for feminist use. The same defect of masking gender under 
another name can be made against it, however. At the same time, 
identifying women's resistance to gender subordination as political opinion 
strikes me as profoundly feminist, if indeed one believes that "the personal 
is political," and that patriarchy is a system constituted primarily through 
power relations, not biology. So in the end, using the category of "political 
opinion" may not be objectionable at all. 
The most dramatic use of "political opinion" in a gender based claim 
appears in the US case Olympia Lazo-Majano v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service.186 In its judgment, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the claim of a Salvadoran domestic worker who was repeatedly 
raped by her employer, a sergeant in the Salvadoran military. Her abuser 
threatened to torture her in other ways, kill her children, and "denounce" 
her as a subversive if she resisted. The abuser was acting outside of his 
official duties.187 On an appeal from her rejection before the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, the Ninth Circuit characterized the reason for the 
claimant's persecution as follows: 
186. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
187. For further discussion of this case and of sexual assault as persecution generally, see 
Castel, supra note 59. 
[I]f the situation is seen in its social context, Zuniga is asserting the political 
opinion that a man has a right to dominate and he has persecuted Olympia 
through force to accept this opinion without rebellion. Zuniga told Olympia 
that in this treatment of her he was seeking revenge. But Olympia knew of no 
injury she had ever done Zuniga. His statement reflects a much more 
generalized animosity to the opposite sex, an assertion of a political aspiration 
and desire to suppress opposition to it. Olympia was not permitted by Zuniga to 
hold an opinion to the contrary. When she asserted one, she became exposed 
to persecution for her assertion. Persecution threatened her because of her 
politicalopinion.188 
The dictum is exceptional in two senses of the word-it is a radically 
feminist pronouncement by a US court, and it has never been followed in 
any other reported case. What this suggests is that pushing "political 
opinion" to its logical limit should not be discounted, but tactically it may 
not be the most viable route. 
As with "political opinion," including women under the rubric "particu-
lar social group" also works, subject to the concerns expressed above about 
how the group ought to be defined. 
Calling women a particular social group can be useful in focusing 
attention on the extent to which the apparently natural category of 
"woman" is socially constructed. Even if one can provisionally accept that 
the universal consequence of being labelled "woman" is subordination, the 
particular form it takes varies culturally, geographically, and temporally. 
Application of a gender-sensitive interpretation of "persecution" assists in 
delineating the specificity of women's oppression, while employing the 
social group label "women" reminds us of the common social position of 
women all over the world. 
Though formulating a particular social group called "women" effec-
tively meets the main practical objectives of designating gender as a 
separate ground of persecution, a concern is raised by this "particular social 
group" strategy in that gender is being relegated to some marginal sub-
category. Surely persecution on the basis of gender is at least as prevalent, 
as pernicious, and as worthy of formal recognition as persecution on the 
basis of race, religion, nationality, etc. My rejoinder is that race, religion, 
and nationality are no less socially constructed than gender. It seems trite to 
observe that differences in skin colour, faith, and national origin only 
become "reasons" for persecution through the inscription of social mean-
ings upon those characteristics by those with the power to generate 
188. Lazo-Majano, supra note 186, at 1435. 
hierarchy out of difference. Indeed, given a choice, I would advocate 
collapsing race, nationality and religion into the "social group" designation 
as well. 189 One cannot deny the possibility that the existence of certain 
'named' categories may appear to give women qua social group a lesser 
status. At this stage, one must consider whether the appropriate tactic is to 
enhance the position of women within a flawed structure, or to adopt a 
principled position at the expense of giving gender the status of a discrete 
ground of persecution. 
At least one more factor ought to be figured into the calculus. 
Interpreting the existing Convention refugee definition to include women as 
a particular social group sets a salutary precedent in two ways. First, other 
nations that are states parties to the Convention can look to the Canadian 
approach in applying the Convention definition in their own jurisdictions. If 
Canada added gender as a separate category, decisionmakers elsewhere 
could easily dismiss the relevance of Canadian caselaw on gender-related 
claims on the basis that the refugee definition in Canada is different. 
Second, women are not the only vulnerable group who are unnamed in 
the refugee definition. Disabled people, the very young and the very old, 
and lesbians and gays may all experience oppression because of their 
personal characteristics. At various times and in various locations, the 
treatment that they endure doubtless constitutes persecution. If women are 
understood as comprising a particular social group, a precedent is estab-
lished for interpreting the particular social group category in the Convention 
refugee definition in ways that encompass age, sexual orientation,190 
disability, etc. If gender is added as a separate category, decision makers 
would have an excuse for rejecting claims based on these other grounds. 
They could simply assert that if the drafters had intended to include 
disability (or age, etc.) in the refugee definition, they would have said so 
explicitly, as they did with gender. l9l In short, it is appropriate to attach 
value to a strategy that has the potential of opening the door to recognizing 
other bases of persecution, thus forging solidarity across categories of 
oppression. 
189. This would leave only two categories upon which a claim of persecution would be 
based-particular social group (who you are) and political opinion (what you believe). 
Of course, a despised group may be assumed by the state to hold political opinions that 
are inimical to the extant distribution of power (e.g. South African blacks may be 
presumed to be anti-apartheid). In the end, even the distinction between political 
opinion and social group may become artificial. 
190. As noted earlier, Ward indicates that sexual orientation could be the basis of social 
group ascription. See also CRDD No. T91-04459, Teitelbaum, Colle (diss.) 12 Mar. 
1993 (Argentinian man's fear of persecution because of sexual orientation accepted). 
191. In fact, prior to the Guidelines, this is exactly what one panel did. In rejecting the claim 
of an Ecuadoran claimant fleeing an abusive partner, the panel conceded that she had 
Whether gender is enumerated explicitly or through the "particular 
social group" designation, it is important to recognize that refugee law, 
unlike Canadian and US equality jurisprudence, has no difficulty contem-
plating the possible multiplicity of grounds of persecution. The UNHCR 
Handbook clearly states: 
It is immaterial whether the persecution arises from any single one of these 
reasons or from a combination of two or more of them. Often the applicant 
himself [sic) may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared. It is 
not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an extent as to identify the 
reasons in detail.192 
Thus, despite the tendency in the Guidelines to promote use of the 
enumerated grounds of persecution before turning to a gendered version of 
"particular social group," there is no legal motive for choosing between 
grounds, if more than one is apposite. If, as the Guidelines observe, both 
race and sex may explain why an Asian woman has a well-founded fear of 
persecution in Africa, both can be asserted jointly as the grounds of 
persecution. This easy acceptance of "intersectionality" in refugee law 
minimizes the danger of distorting the presentation of a woman's claim in 
the name of facilitating success in the hearing room. 
C. Clash of the Discourses 
Beginning with Simone de Beauvoir and moving on to contemporary post-
modernists, feminist theorists both delineate and critique a model of 
Woman as objectified Other, against whom Man defines and asserts himself 
as subjective Self.193 Parallel dichotomies have been drawn along the 
dimensions of race and culture: the westernized or northern Self versus the 
exotic eastern or southern Other. As in these domains, so too can refugee 
discourse be organized according to a Self/Other opposition. In the refugee 
context, there are "refugee-producers" and "refugee-acceptors." Canada, 
been persecuted and that the state could not protect her. Nevertheless, it ruled that her 
fear of persecution was not related to any of the Convention grounds. 
One's sex is not one of the five enumerated reasons. It was within the power of the drafters of the 
Convention to include sex as an independent reason, and they apparently chose not to do so. It 
was also within the power of Parliament to include sex as an independent reason, when 
incorporating the Convention definition as part of our Act, and they also apparently chose not to 
do so. Such being the case, it would appear that a claim based solely on the sex of a claimant does 
not fall within the parameters of the definition. 
CRDD No. T92-03227, supra note 141, at 8. 
192. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 36, at '1\ 66. 
193. For an introductory survey of various conceptions of woman as Other, see ROSEMARIE 
TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT 195-234 (1989). This binary structure of analysis is not 
universally accepted by feminists, nor does consensus exist regarding the signification 
and valuation of being Other. 
the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the states of Western Europe 
(that is to say, the "Western" nations) locate themselves firmly in the latter 
camp, and constitute themselves as distinctive and superior by reference to 
what they are not, namely, the kind of governments that do the kinds of 
things to people that propel them to claim refugee status. To describe 
oneself as a refugee-acceptor is to say that one is also a "nonrefugee-
producer." Indeed, during the Reagan/Bush era, the United States projected 
this formulation even further. Because the United States does not produce 
refugees (so the argument went), it followed that it could not participate in 
generating refugees elsewhere.194 Therefore, no government supported by 
the United States (Guatemala, EI Salvador, etc.) could possibly be a refugee-
producing country. In reality, the categories are not always mutually 
exclusive; the Ward case features a refugee claimant from Ireland. Yet so 
strong is the notion that only "they" produce refugees that the most recent 
amendments to Canada's immigration law raise the standard of proof that 
claimants from designated "nonrefugee-producing" countries must satisfy to 
establish their claim.195 
Now, this distinction between refugee-producing and refugee-accepting 
countries may have a certain real world appeal when applied to extreme 
violations of classic liberal individual rights by state agents-the torture of 
political dissidents, for example. What happens, however, when the Self/ 
Other bifurcation of feminist discourse is superimposed on this Self/Other 
dichotomy of refugee discourse? My hypothesis is that taking gender 
persecution seriously requires one to traverse the boundaries of the binary 
opposition upon which the refugee paradigm is constructed. In other words, 
the phenomenon of gender persecution challenges the self-understanding of 
so-called "nonrefugee-producers." 
Consider first the assertion that "severe discrimination on grounds of 
gender" constitutes persecution. The 1993 UN Human Development Report 
arrives at the utterly unstartling conclusion from its analysiS of 33 countries, 
194. See NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT, AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 1992), at 1. (As 
of 1988, "Applicants from countries considered "hostile" to the United States, such as 
the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Iran, were granted at a rate 
greater than 50 percent. By comparison, applicants from countries considered "friendly" 
to the United States, such as Guatemala and EI Salvador, were granted at a rate less than 
3 percent, regardless of the strength of the case.") 
195. Refugee claims are adjudicated in panels of two. In the event of a tie, the decision goes 
in favor of the claimant unless the claimant, inter alia, comes from a country designated 
by regulation as "a country that respects human rights." Immigration Act, § 69.10. The 
legislation was enacted early in 1993, and the Conservative government that passed it 
did not designate any countries prior to being voted out of office. The new Liberal 
government has not designated any countries. 
that "no country treats its women as well as it treats its men."196 Japan ranks 
among the worst of those who record gender-based statistics, but both 
Canada and the United States fell in their quality-of-life rankings when the 
treatment of women was included.197 
Given that every country discriminates against women, how will the 
line be drawn between "mere" discrimination, and discrimination so 
"severe" that it amounts to persecution? One concern is that the line may be 
drawn by reference to whatever "we" (the nonrefugee-producing country) 
do. What "we" do is discrimination. The more the claimant's state looks 
different from ours, the more what "they" do begins to look to "us" like 
persecution. In other words, the fear is that cultural difference may become 
the yardstick along which the shift from discrimination to persecution will 
be measured. 
The same principle may apply to the assessment of whether the state is 
able or willing to protect a claimant from private acts of violence. Indeed, 
the Ward decision hints at this propensity by citing with approval the 
Federal Court of Appeal judgment in Satiacum v. MEI.19B The case involved 
a US Indian Chief who was convicted of federal criminal charges but fled to 
Canada before sentencing. He based his refugee claim on the contention 
that his life would be endangered if he were incarcerated in a federal prison 
and that the US authorities would be unable to protect him from that risk. 
Although his claim succeeded before the Immigration Appeal Board,199 on 
review, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected Satiacum's fear as "well 
founded" by invoking a presumption that democracies (like the United 
States) have fair and independent judicial processes. This presumption can 
only be rebutted by evidence "substantially impeaching, for example, the 
jury selection process in the relevant part of the country, or the indepen-
dence or fair-mindedness of the judiciary itself."2°O 
Justice La Forest endorsed this heightened presumption against the 
legitimacy of claims from democratic countries as follows: 
Although this presumption increases the burden on the claimant, it does not 
render illusory Canada's provision of a haven for refugees. The presumption 
serves to reinforce the underlying rationale of international protection as a 
surrogate, coming into play where no alternative remains to the claimant. 
196. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVElOPMENT REPORT 1993 16 
(1993). 
197. {d. Sweden, Denmark, and New Zealand improved their rank when gender was taken 
into account, suggesting that the gender "gap" in quality of life is smaller in those 
countries. 
198. 99 N.R. 171 (1989). 
199. The predecessor to the Immigration and Refugee Board. 
200. Satiacum, supra note 198, at 176 (quoted in Ward, supra note 11, at 725). 
Refugee claims were never meant to allow a claimant to seek out better 
protection than that from which he or she benefits already.201 
Implicit in this passage is the assumption that unless and until the 
claimant can impeach the integrity of the entire criminal justice system in all 
its manifestations, recourse to local protection remains a meaningful 
alternative to flight. Quite apart from the dubiety of this presumption, the 
evidentiary hurdle placed before the claimant is practically insurmountable, 
and virtually guarantees that she will be unable to rebut the presumption 
that local protection is a genuine option. Consider the US woman who is 
battered by her spouse. It is well known that the "system"-from police, to 
prosecutors, to judges, fails to protect women from abusive partners.202 
While a woman may be able to describe incidents from her own experience 
that illustrate this phenomenon, how can she bring the entire US police and 
judicial machinery into disrepute? Does it matter if five women were 
protected from their abusers if fifty others (including her) were not, or vice 
versa? The availability of state protection can rarely be described in 
absolutes. How often does it have to fail before a claimant's fear of abuse 
and lack of faith in state protection will be validated as objectively well-
founded?203 
The near impossibility of displacing a presumption in favor of democra-
cies like Canada serves another important legitimating function. If the 
United States were ever understood to be a producer of refugee women, 
could Canada escape the same verdict? If the Canadian state cannot, or will 
not, protect its own women nationals any better than does the United States, 
any Canadian tribunal that grants asylum to a US woman fleeing domestic 
violence veers perilously close to confronting the fact that the same country 
that has won deserved praise for enacting the Guidelines is also implicated 
in practices that amount to gender persecution. Erecting an evidentiary 
barrier to the admission of refugee claimants from countries [unlcomfortably 
similar to Canada presents one strategy for deflecting this discomfiting irony. 
It does so only at the expense of diluting persecution from an absolute to a 
relative condition. One is persecuted if the state cannot, or will not, protect 
you, but only if Canada can or will protect you in similar circumstances. 
The perils of pursuing a gender analysis to its logical conclusion are 
glaring. At some point, every country becomes a refugee producing country. 
The reason no one notices is because women have nowhere to flee. There 
is no safe haven: "As a woman I have no country." 
201 . Ward, supra note 11, at 726. 
202. See Statistics Canada, The Violence Against Women Survey, THE DAilY, 18 Nov. 1993. 
203. In the unlikely event that an American woman ever made a claim of this type in Canada, 
it would likely founder on the availability of an internal flight alternative. 
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Once again, I worry that cultural chauvinism may be employed to 
distinguish between those states which are "unwilling or unable" to protect 
women from domestic violence (non-democracies, current refugee produc-
ers), and those states whose justice systems are simply "imperfect" and 
cannot be held accountable for an inability to protect each individual 
woman from each individual criminal assailant (democracies and general 
respecters of human rights). Indeed, recent feminist scholarship from the 
United States on gender persecution and refugee status evinces a distressing 
degree of cultural hyperopia regarding local conditions for women. It seems 
that when some North American feminists want to make a pitch for granting 
asylum to victims of gender persecution elsewhere, they become tactically 
blind to the compelling evidence gathered by other North American 
feminists documenting local practices that might constitute gender persecu-
tion. At the very moment North American feminists turn to condemn 
misogyny in the "third world," they lose sight of the fact that our own 
culture hardly presents a model of gender equality. 
For example, Linda Ciprianpo4 surveys the world, gathering examples of 
gender persecution. She takes her samples from Iran and Pakistan (Islamic 
Law), India (Hinduism), Africa ("tribal custom"), Brazil, Argentina, and Peru 
("machismo policies and practices'').205 In each case, the source of persecu-
tion is located in a religion other than Christianity, customs of nonwhite 
societies, or "cultural norms" about women that are portrayed as locally 
specific. For instance, Cipriani attributes the patriarchal orientation of law in 
South America to the stereotypes of machismo and marianismo, with no 
mention of the influence of the Catholic church in sustaining and perpetu-
ating misogynist practices. Conversely, Hinduism and Islam are identified as 
the culprits in the persecution of women in Iran, Pakistan, and India. 
According to the data collected by Cipriani about Zimbabwe, "wife 
beating is a 'major problem' and the police rarely interfere."2ob In Peru, 
"eighty percent of all violent crimes reported to the police on a daily basis 
are beatings of women by their husbands. Police give these crimes low 
priority."207 One might assume from her depiction that what goes on in 
Zimbabwe and Peru is exceptional; yet, anyone acquainted with violence 
against women in North America knows otherwise. The inadequacy of the 
official response to domestic violence characterizes every country, includ-
ing the United States and Canada. In fact, most of the available data on 
204. Linda Cipriani, HGender and PersecutionH Protecting Women Under International Law, 
7 GEO. IMM. L.J. 511 (1993). 
205. Id. at 513-33. 
206. Id. at 524-25. 
207. Id. at 531. 
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domestic violence emerges from studies conducted in North America, 
Western Europe, and Australia/New Zealand.20s 
In addition, North American feminist scholars themselves have zeal-
ously exposed the practice of domestic violence in the United States (and 
elsewhere) as a potential international human rights violation. In her article, 
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 
Rhonda Copelon explains her decision to use domestic violence as the 
focus of her inquiry as follows: 
I have deliberately chosen to focus on the most mundane and universal form of 
violence, and one which is equally prevalent in United States society, rather 
than on forms of violence that are viewed as unusual by Western societies. I do 
this ... because pointing the finger at other culture-specific forms of gender 
violence such as genital mutilation or dowry deaths undermines taking 
seriously comparable wrongs in this society; ... 2()<) 
In a similar vein, Katherine Culliton210 details the extent of domestic 
violence in the United States, Brazil, and Chile in order to vindicate 
"American women's fundamental right to state protection from domestic 
violence"211 under international human rights law. Her description of the 
condition of women in the Americas reveals that, if differences exist in the 
adequacy of state protection, such differences are quantitative and not 
qualitative. In her view, all surveyed states in the Americas fall below 
acceptable standards. Neither Copelon nor Culliton direct their attention to 
the refugee context. Yet, it is virtually axiomatic to state that, if domestic 
violence is torture, and the United States does not respect a woman's right 
to state protection from domestic violence qua torture, at least some US 
women would be viable candidates for refugee status. 
One group of women who are particularly vulnerable to domestic 
violence in North America are migrant women. Ironically, Pamela Goldberg 
commences her article advocating asylum for women fleeing intimate 
violence with the story of an undocumented Pakistani woman living in the 
United States with her abusive husband, who was a legal resident.212 
Goldberg's narrative depicts how the woman fears leaving her husband and 
returning to Pakistan, because either his or her family will "punish" her for 
208. Violence Against Women in the Family, supra note 143, at 5. 
209. Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as 
Torture, 25 COL. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 291, 296 n.12 (citations omitted) (1994). Her article is 
in many ways a companion piece to Romany's stimulating article, supra note 103. 
210. Katherine Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to State Protection 
from Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 507 (1993). 
211. Id. at 507. 
212. Goldberg, supra note 13, at 567. 
--------------------
"disrespecting her husband." She "also believes that the police and the 
courts [in Pakistan] would do nothing to protect her-nor would they be 
able to-because the family is considered sacrosanct and the law will not 
act in any way to interfere in such matters."213 Curiously, the fact that the 
husband beat, slapped, punched, and verbally abused his wife with 
impunity for several years in the United States escapes comment.214 
Elsewhere, American Margaret O'Herron215 cogently demonstrates how the 
US Marriage Fraud Act216 actually heightens the vulnerability of immigrant 
women who are dependent on their spouses to sponsor them for permanent 
residence. The statute requires that nonimmigrant spouses be sponsored by 
citizens or permanent residents. Women in battering relationships will not 
report abuse to the police for fear that their spouses will disclose their 
undocumented status or withdraw extant sponsorship applications, either of 
which could lead to deportation. As O'Herron states, the Marriage Fraud 
Act "cruelly forces many immigrant women to choose between risking their 
lives as victims of battery and risking their lives as deportees to countries in 
which survival may be unlikely."217 In this sense, US law (and its Canadian 
counterpart)218 effectively denies protection to immigrant women who are 
battered. However, Goldberg's narrative suppresses this reality in order to 
play up the brutality facing the claimant in Pakistan. 
Perhaps the most striking illustration of how Western advocates don 
blinders for tactical reasons occurs in the context of sexual orientation as a 
basis for asylum. In her article, "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: 
Political Asylum and the Global Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men," 
Suzanne Goldberg219 urges refugee recognition for lesbians and gays who 
are persecuted because of their sexual orientation. Ms. Goldberg acknowl-
edges that several US states criminalize consensual sex between lesbians 
213. Id. at 568. 
214. In the author's narrative, the woman sought refuge in a woman's shelter. No reference 
to police or state protection is made. 
215. Margaret M.R. O'Herron, Note, Ending Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 549 (1993). 
216. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1186a (1986). 
217. O'Herron, supra note 215, at 567. 
218. In a case reported in the Canadian press, Judy Henderson's husband withdrew his 
sponsorship after she had him charged with assault. Henderson, who was pregnant, 
faced the prospect of deportation to Trinidad a week before the assault trial. 
Immigration-Abuse, Bgt, CANADIAN PRESS, 29 Dec. 1993, available in QUICKlAW, CP93 
Database. More recently, Marie Sanchez, a Nicaraguan immigrant, was deported when 
her abusive husband withdrew her sponsorship after she left him. The Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration has since formed a team to investigate the withdrawal of 
sponsorships of immigrant family members. Abuse of Sponsored Women Probed, GLOBE 
AND MAil, 22 July 1994, at A4. 
219. Suzanne Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum and the Global 
Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNEll INT'L l.J. 605 (1993). 
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and between gay men, and that these laws have been upheld as constitu-
tional by the United States Supreme Court.220 Ms. Goldberg ducks this 
embarrassing conundrum by implying that laws criminalizing consensual 
sex between same-sex partners only amount to persecution "when the 
penalties imposed are extremely severe, disproportionate to the putative 
statutory goal, or administered without due process."221 Goldberg appears to 
accept that criminalization itself would be insufficient to constitute persecu-
tion. Goldberg continues in the same vein by contending that, in any event, 
"criminalization of sodomy in parts of the United States should not interfere 
with the grant of asylum to a person whose life is endangered because she 
or he is lesbian or gay":222 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick that the constitutional right 
to privacy does not encompass sexual relations between consenting lesbian and 
gay adults is largely irrelevant to the discussion of whether lesbians and gay 
men are eligible for asylum. Bowers, a due process challenge to the Georgia 
sodomy law, focuses exclusively on criminalization of sexual conduct, with no 
reference to lesbian or gay identity. Moreover, both before and after Bowers, 
courts have refused to permit infringement of established constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection and first amendment freedoms based on prejudice 
against gay men and lesbians.223 
Goldberg's attempts to find a legal space for refugee status on the basis 
of sexual orientation while leaving Bowers v. Hardwick undisturbed are 
lame at best. Her apparent concession that criminalizing sexual relations 
between consenting adults of the same sex would be insufficient to 
constitute persecution is inexplicable as a matter of refugee law, because 
the UNHCR Handbook recognizes that "penal prosecution for a reason 
mentioned in the definition ... may in itself amount to persecution."224 To 
the extent that sexual orientation may constitute membership in a particular 
social group (as Justice La Forest stated in Ward) it is certainly arguable that 
the criminalization of sexual relations among lesbians and gay men per se 
constitutes persecution. Moreover, her overdetermined distinction between 
lesbian and gay identity versus lesbian and gay sexual activity, is a product 
of necessity arising from trends in US jurisprudence. Apart from that 
context, the claim that there is "a critical distinction between regulation of 
sexual activity and persecution of lesbians and gay men"225 is a distinction 
220. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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without a difference when it comes to consensual sex between adults of the 
same sex. How much simpler it would be for Goldberg to just admit that 
certain states in the United States persecute people within the meaning of 
the Convention refugee definition on the basis of their sexual orientationJ226 
There are two plausible explanations for the unwillingness of Western 
scholars to own up to their own countries' persecutory practices, be it with 
respect to violence against women, or the persecution of lesbians and gay 
men. One reason is the implicit binary structure of refugee discourse. If the 
United States, or Canada, or Australia are refugee-acceptors, it follows that 
whatever they do cannot constitute persecution, because that would make 
them potential refugee-producers. Even for sincere feminist and lesbian/gay 
advocates, this unarticulated commitment to the moral status of Western 
nations qua refugee-acceptors seems to have the effect of temporarily 
disconnecting the local outlet of an otherwise lively critical apparatus. It is 
one thing to admit to ourselves that our local practices violate fundamental 
human rights; it is quite another to admit it to the international community. 
There is another related reason why commentators may deliberately 
ignore or repress reference to local practice. In principle, refugee status is an 
absolute concept. If one is persecuted, one is entitled to asylum. Yet, if 
countries of refuge cannot guarantee a woman that she will be protected 
from the kind of persecution that she flees, what is the point of granting her 
refuge? Indeed, can one even talk meaningfully about "refuge" under these 
circumstances? The problem is particularly acute for feminist theorists. 
Women's exclusion from a given patriarchal civil society is often depicted in 
the scholarship as the denial of citizenship status.227 Or, as Celina Romany 
asserts, "Women are the paradigmatic alien subjects of international law ... 
Women are aliens within their states, aliens within an international 
exclusive club that constitutes international society."228 
Although it may be tempting to claim that women are not true citizens 
in any society, this assertion proves too powerful when held up against the 
claims of women who are literally and phYSically exiled from their countries 
of nationality. Thus, the danger of confronting the universality of women's 
oppression lies in the rejoinder that women are always and never refu-
gees-always, because they cannot confidently rely on state protection 
wherever they live; and never, because there is no place to which they can 
226. Much like US women who are battered, Georgian gays and lesbians would probably fail 
in any putative refugee claim because they have an "internal flight alternative." They 
can move to a state that does not criminalize homosexuality. This does not detract from 
the persecutory character of the laws, however. 
227. See SUSAN MOlLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (revised ed. 1992); ELSHTAIN, 
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flee. For those who champion the claims of women fleeing gender 
persecution, this latter inference must be avoided at all costs. One tactic is 
to ignore or downplay the pervasive failure of refugee accepting countries to 
protect women from intimate violence. 
The practical consequence of this effacement will be that gender 
persecution will be most visible and identifiable as such when it is 
committed by a cultural Other. This strategy will enable so-called refugee-
acceptors to neutralize and assimilate feminist insights about the relation-
ship between patriarchy and the state into a refugee determination system 
that desires, above all, to sustain its self-understanding as a nonrefugee-
producer. Practices such as dowry burning, dress codes, and genital 
mutilation will present cases that are relatively "easy" to recognize as 
gender persecution. State indifference to violence against women will be 
more problematic, and the identity of the country of nationality as a 
traditional "refugee-producer" may well enhance the probability of success 
for the claimant. 
At one level, this provisional stance of Western superiority in the realm 
of gender relations seems innocuous enough, in that it is deployed in a 
discursive setting that is meant to benefit individual women seeking asylum. 
At another level, however, it bespeaks a certain ethnocentrism that is willing 
to posit Western women as "the normative referent"229 against which the 
situation of Other women will be evaluated-and pitied. In her critique of 
the portrayal of the "third world woman" by some feminist scholars, 
Chandra Mohanty reveals the patronizing implications of this method: 
a comparison between Western feminist self-presentation and Western feminist 
re-presentation of women in the third world yields significant results. Universal 
images of the "third world woman" (the veiled woman, chaste virgin etc.), 
images constructed from adding the "third world difference" to "sexual 
difference," are predicated upon (and hence obviously bring into sharper focus) 
assumptions about Western women as secular, liberated, and having control 
over their own lives. This is not to suggest that Western women are secular, 
liberated and in control of their own lives. I am referring to a discursive self-
presentation, not necessarily to material reality. If this were a material reality, 
there would be no need for political movements in the West.230 
Far from complaining that Western feminists are indulging in essential-
ism by projecting their own experiences as universal, Mohanty reproaches 
them for going to the opposite extreme. This is what philosopher Jane 
229. Chandra Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses, 
in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 51, 56 (Chandra Mohanty et al. eds., 
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Roland Martin231 calls the "self-made trap of false difference."232 Martin 
asserts that in the rush to atone for the sins of essentialism, some feminists 
have fetishized differences among women to the point where there exists 
nothing except difference:233 
Cutting us off from the developmental insights of feminist psychologists and 
denying us the chance to discover even limited cross-cultural and temporal 
commonalities, [false difference) encourages us to construct not just other times 
and places but also other women as utterly Other.234 
What this means in the refugee context is that we suppress the 
commonality of gender oppression across cultures to ensure that what is 
done to Other women looks so utterly different from (or unspeakably worse 
than) what is done to women here, that no one would notice a contradiction 
in admitting them as refugees. The logic of the dichotomy of refugee-
acceptor/refugee-producer compels a parallel classification of Western 
woman/Other woman that serves to facilitate the admission of at least some 
women fleeing gender persecution, but only by adopting a method that is 
politically and empirically problematic. 
If one abandons the provisional fiction that Canada is a haven from 
gender persecution, does it follow ineluctably that claimants fleeing gender 
persecution must be rejected? Not necessarily. It would, however, call for a 
rethinking of the basis upon which refugees are accepted. Asylum is 
ordinarily predicated on the understanding that one flees a place of danger 
for a place of safety. Taking seriously the situation of battered women in 
"refugee-acceptor" states means that granting asylum to battered women 
from elsewhere offers contingent protection at best. It only protects a 
particular woman from a particular abuser located in another country, and 
even then, only if he does not pursue her to Canada. It cannot guarantee her 
adequate protection should the woman find herself in a battering relation-
ship in Canada. 
Dularie's situation provides a useful illustration of this point. The fact 
that her spouse was convicted eleven times of threatening or committing 
assaults against her in Canada suggests that the Canadian state did not 
actually protect her all that effectively from spousal violence, even though 
prosecution of her husband was more than she ever obtained in Trinidad. At 
the same time, once her spouse returned to Trinidad (from whence he 
continued to issue death threats), allowing Dularie to remain in Canada 
231. Jane Roland Martin, Methodological Essentialism, False Difference, and Other Danger-
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furnished her with greater protection than would be available to her in 
Trinidad. The real test of Canadian commitment to protection may arise if 
Dularie's husband ever attempts to reenter Canada. Recognizing its sover-
eign duty to protect nationals, would Canada exclude him at the border in 
the name of protecting her? 
CONCLUSION 
Catharine MacKinnon notes: 
In the structure of international human rights, based as it is on the interest of 
states in their sovereignty as such, no state has an incentive to break rank by 
going after another state for how it treats women-thus setting a standard of 
human rights treatment for women that no state is prepared to meet within its 
own borders or is willing to be held to internationally .... There is no state we 
can point to and say, "This state effectively guarantees women's human rights. 
There we are free and equal."235 
Though MacKinnon may be right about the self-interest of states in the 
sphere of international human rights, the Guidelines belie her assertion in 
the context of refugee law, inasmuch as Canada now presumes to judge 
how other states treat their women for purposes of refugee determination. 
By the same token, Canada is still not a country that can proclaim itself a 
paragon of freedom and sex equality. This paradox is unlikely to vanish in 
the near future. 
It is interesting to speculate about why refugee law seems more 
amenable than the international human rights regime to acting on the 
insight that states are as accountable for a failure to protect women from 
"private" violations as they are for the "public" violations that states 
themselves commit. Perhaps it is because states owe no obligations to 
nationals of other countries under international human rights law. There is 
no incentive to take an active interest in the human rights of women 
elsewhere, and as MacKinnon points out, a certain self-interest in not doing 
so. In the refugee context, states party to the Convention are obliged to 
assess the conduct of other states in the course of resolving individual cases 
brought before their tribunals. Moreover, a state hearing a refugee claim is 
bound under international refugee law not to return a claimant to a country 
where she may be persecuted. In effect, states owe the claimant a legal 
obligation to judge the actions of the state from which she has fled. 
235. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 15. 
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By the first anniversary of the Guidelines' release, some 350 gender-
related claims had been identified. Of the 150 claims that were finalized, 
approximately 70 percent led to the granting of refugee status.236 Clearly, 
decision makers are paying attention to the Guidelines. Though members of 
the CRDD are encouraged to write reasons for positive decisions that apply 
the Guidelines, and are required to issue written reasons for all negative 
decisions, relatively few of the decisions have been reported. Therefore, it is. 
not possible to paint a complete picture of who is accepted, from which 
countries, and for what reasons. 
The first case heard after the Guidelines were issued led to a positive 
determination on behalf an Ecuadoran woman fleeing domestic abuse. The 
claimant's evidence of her personal experiences and the documentary 
evidence describing the absence of state protection were so compelling that 
the Board commented as follows: 
This documentary evidence makes it abundantly clear that the government of 
Ecuador is unwilling to protect the rights of women who are subject to domestic 
abuse. They have to endure the trauma of violence in silence while the 
enforcing authority of the state does nothing in their defence, and regards such 
abuses as domestic issues. This culture of tolerance has been built up over the 
years and forms part of the ethic of Ecuadorian society. The question is whether 
the violence endured by these women in appropriate cases should be regarded 
as persecution. There is a vast difference between a matrimonial home and a 
torture chamber. If a wife is subjected to violence repeatedly then in our 
assessment, she stands in no different situation than a person who has been 
arrested, detained and beaten on a number of occasions because of his political 
opinion. As a matter of fact, such a person suffers to a lesser degree over a 
period of time, because after each detention he is release [sic) and enjoys his 
freedom. The wife on the other hand has no respite from her agony of torture 
and grief. She must endure these misfortunes continuously. The law should not 
sit idly by while those who seek relief lose hope, and those who abuse it are 
emboldened by its failure to provide sanctions.2J7 
A recent decision that garnered widespread media attention involved 
the successful claim by a Somali woman and her two children.238 The 
daughter's claim was based on a well-founded fear of genital mutilation 
236. Immigration and Refugee Board, "First Anniversary of Guidelines on Women Refugee 
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should she be returned to Somalia.239 The panel ruled that "this minor 
claimant's right to personal security would be grossly infringed if she were 
forced to undergo female genital mutilation .... "240 To its credit, the panel 
used African sources to document the practice, and noted that "[s]ubjecting 
a young girl to FGM is seen as a 'torturous custom' by women's rights 
advocates in Africa who are campaigning to eradicate this practice."241 
Another salient feature of this Somali decision is that the panel ruled 
that the daughter had a well-founded fear of persecution based on her 
membership in two particular social groups, namely women and minors.242 
The panel explicitly referred to Ward in adopting a broad approach to 
designating the relevant social groups,243 while other decisions have 
followed a more restrictive approach and defined the particular social group 
in terms such as "Ecuadoran women subject to wife abuse"244 or "Bulgarian 
women vulnerable to wife abuse by men with government influence."245 
The IRB has yet to adopt a preferred position with respect to defining a 
gendered social group category. 
The Guidelines are still relatively new, and it is rumored that they may 
yet be revised in light of the Ward decision. For those interested in 
addressing the phenomenon of gender persecution in the refugee determi-
nation process elsewhere, the Guidelines are available as a template upon 
which one can devise a model tailored to the particular jurisdiction in 
which it will operate. 
At a theoretical level, the Guidelines also present a challenge to implicit 
assumptions about the stability of categories. Finding a principled basis for 
admitting women who flee gender persecution requires a reevaluation of 
what refuge means. It also requires Western feminists to ask themselves 
searching questions about the shifting significance of the categories "woman" 
and "refugee" in local versus transnational contexts. What distinguishes the 
239. A French tribunal accepted a similar claim in 1991: Re Aminate Diop, French Refugee 
Appeals Board, recours No. 164078 (Sept. 1991), reported in Case Abstract IJRl/0097, 
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refugee claimant who flees Trinidad for Canada to escape an abusive 
husband from the Canadian citizen who flees Toronto for Swift Current for 
the same reason? 
Like many other events in human experience, refugee determination is 
a process in which the subject's agency is subordinated to the definitional 
power of others. In exercising this power to confer the label "refugee" on a 
woman, we are forced to confront categorization as a political choice. 
Which women we call refugees, how and why we allocate them to that 
category, and which women we do not so designate, reveals as much about 
how we define ourselves as it does about those whom we define. 
